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Abstract
This Comment argues that the recently decided case of U.S. Shoe should be upheld by the
Federal Circuit upon review because allowing the continued imposition of the HMT would ad-
versely affect the U.S. export industry and subject the Government to possible North American
Free Trade Agreement (“NAFTA”) violations. Part I provides background information regarding
Congress’ commerce and taxation powers. Part I also analyzes the constitutional restrictions on
taxation and presents the judicial interpretations of the Export Clause and Import-Export Clause.
Part I then describes the CIT and how it functions. Next, Part I presents a review of NAFTA and
U.S.-Canada trade relations. Finally, Part I introduces background information on the HMT and
Harbor Maintenance Trust Fund (“Trust Fund”), and examines the problems surrounding this tax
and the disputes leading to the U.S. Shoe holding. Part II analyzes the CIT’s decision in U.S. Shoe.
Part III argues that U.S. Shoe was correctly decided by the CIT, and that the traditional approach to
Export Clause analysis should be upheld and applied in the future. This Comment concludes that
U.S. Shoe should be upheld in order to preserve the success of maritime trade between U.S. and
Canadian ports, the competitiveness of U.S. ports, and the validity of a well-established Supreme
Court precedent.
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INTRODUCTION
The U.S. Constitution prohibits the U.S. Government from
taxing goods exported out of the United States" and prevents
individual states from levying taxes on goods exported from
their territory.2 As originally adopted, the Export Clause' and
the Import-Export Clause 4 protected the Southern States5 from
interference by the Federal Government 6 and the Northern
States.7 As far back as 1787,8 the drafters of the Export Clause
recognized the need for unrestricted free trade with other coun-
tries.9 The Export Clause and Import-Export Clause help to in-
* J.D. Candidate, 1997, Fordham University.
1. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 5 ("[n]o Tax or Duty shall be laid on Articles exported
from any State"). With the adoption of Article I, § 9, clause 5 ("Export Clause"), the
free trade of exports became a part of the fundamental law of the United States.
GEORGE BANCROFT, 2 HISTORY OF THE FORMATION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA 152 (1882).
2. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 2 ("No State shall, without the Consent of Congress,
lay any Imposts or Duties on Imports or Exports").
3. U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 5. Article I, § 9, clause 5 is known as the Export Clause.
International Business Machs. Corp. v. United States, 59 F.3d 1234, 1236 (Fed. Cir.
1995), cert. granted, 116 S.Ct. 594 (Dec. 8, 1995) [hereinafter IBM].
4. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 2. Article I, § 10, clause 2 is referrred to as the
Import-Export Clause. IBM, 59 F.3d at 1234, 1236.
5. CHARLES WARREN, THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 573 (1937). The South-
ern States, represented at the 1787 Constitutional Convention by Virginia, Maryland,
North Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia, were financially dependant on the expor-
tation of their crops to provide revenues and, therefore supported the adoption of the
Export Clause restriction. Id.
6. 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, 362 (Max Farrand ed., 1937)
[hereinafter RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION]. During the Convention, Elbridge
Gerry of Massachusetts stated, "we have given it [general government] more power al-
ready than we know how will be exercised, it will enable the [general government] to
oppress the States." Id.
7. Note, Constitutionality of Export Controls, 76 YALE L. J. 200, 204 (1966) [hereinaf-
ter Export Controls]. According to James Madison's notes, Mr. Langdon, a constitutional
delegate, recognized that, "[it] seems to be feared that the Northern States will oppress
the trade of the South[er]n." 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 6, at
359.
8. Id. at 204. The Constitutional Convention was held in Philadelphia in 1787.
WARREN, supra note 5, at 99.
9. Export Controls, supra note 7, at 204-06. Mr. Clymer, a constitutional delegate,
noted that as a result of export taxation, "[tihe middle States may apprehend an op-
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sure the success of the United States in relation to foreign com-
petitors by not allowing federal or state government to restrict
foreign trade.' 0
Nonetheless, the Federal Government taxes cargo exported
by vessel out of U.S. ports and harbors." Established in 1986,
the Harbor Maintenance Tax 12 ("HMT") places a tax of 0.125
percent on cargo loaded onto a vessel for exportation to a non-
U.S. port.' The U.S. Congress passed the HMT in order to help
support federally funded development and maintenance of U.S.
ports'" and harbors.' As a result of the HMT, U.S. exporters
and U.S. ports have lost millions of dollars and endured compet-
itive harm with respect to Canada over the last nine years. 16
pression of their wheat flour, provisions, & c., and with more reason, as these articles
were exposed to a competition in foreign markets not incident to tob[acc]o, rice & c
.... " 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 6, at 363.
10. Export Controls, supra note 7, at 204-05.
11. 26 U.S.C. §§ 4461(a), 4462(a) (1994).
12. Harbor Maintenance Revenue Act of 1986, 26 U.S.C. §§ 4461-62 (1994). Con-
gress established the Harbor Maintenance Tax ("HMT") as part of the Water Resources
Development Act of 1986. Water Resources Development Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-
662, 100 Stat. 4082 (Nov. 17, 1986) (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. § 2201 et seq.
(1994) and scattered sections of 26 U.S.C. (1994)) [hereinafter Water Resources Act of
1986].
13. 26 U.S.C. § 4461(b) (1994). The HMT is placed upon "port use," which is
defined as the loading or unloading of commercial cargo to or from a vessel at a port.
26 U.S.C. § 4462(a)(1)(A)-(B) (1994).
14. H.R. REP. No. 228, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1986); S. REP. No. 126, 99th Cong.,
1st Sess. 6 (1985). The term "port" includes any channel or harbor in the customs
territory of the United States that is not an inland waterway and is open to public trans-
portation. 19 C.F.R. § 24.24 (b) (1) (1995). Code of Federal Regulations § 24.24 (b)(1)
gives an exhaustive list of the approximately 200 ports that are subject to the HMT. Id.
15. S. REP. No. 126, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1985). A harbor is an area adjoining
navigable water used to land, unload, repair, dismantle, or build a vessel. THOMAS J.
SCHOENBAUM, 1 ADMIRALTY & MARITIME LAw § 7.2, at 373 (1994). Harbors are included
within the term port. 19 C.F.R. § 24.24(b) (1) (1995).
16. Water Resources Development Act of 1995: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Water
Resources and Environment of the House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, 104th
Cong., 1st Sess. 142 (Feb. 7, 1995) [hereinafter Stromberg Statement] (prepared statement
of Erik Stromberg, President, American Association of Port Authorities) (commenting
that HMT puts U.S. ports at competitive disadvantage with Canadian ports for U.S.
export business). In 1988, the Port of Tacoma estimated that US$11.4 million in U.S.
exports and imports were shipped through Canadian ports. Cumulative Impact of Taxes
and Various Fees Levied on the Maritime Industy: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Over-
sights and Investigations, House Merchant Marine and Fisheries Committee, 102d Cong., 1st
Sess. 157 (May 23, 1991) [hereinafter Valenti Statement] (prepared statement of Joseph
L. Valenti, Port Director, Tampa Port Authority). This diversion of cargo to Canada
represents an increase of nearly 60% over the last two years. Id. This cargo diversion
accounts for 1250 lost vessel calls, 325,000 full containers of diverted cargo and the loss
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Consequently, approximately one hundred major U.S. exporters
challenged the constitutionality of the HMT.17 On October 25,
1995, the U.S. Court of International Trade" ("CIT") in United
States Shoe Corp. v. United States,19 held the HMT to be unconstitu-
tional.20  The court ruled that the HMT constituted a tax upon
exports prohibited by the Export Clause of the Constitution.2 a
Following the decision, the Government filed for appeal to the
of port labor and maritime related revenue. Cumulative Impact of Taxes and Various Fees
Levied on the Maritime Industry: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Oversights and Investiga-
tions, House Merchant Marine and Fisheries Committee, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 75 (May 23,
1991) [hereinafter Aylward Statement] (testimony of Anne Aylward, Maritime Director,
Massachusetts Port Authority).
More specifically, Andersons Management Corporation, the owner of a major
grain elevator complex in Ohio, complains that during 1989-91, the U.S. Great Lakes
ports have lost 5250 million bushels of grain to railway transportation travelling to Ca-
nadian ports. Cumulative Impact of Taxes and Various Fees Levied on the Maritime Industry:
Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Oversights and Investigations, House Merchant Marine and
Fisheries Committee, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 132 (May 23, 1991) [hereinafter Mock Letter]
(letter of Sharon Mock, Grain Transporter Coordinator, The Andersons Management
Corp. to John Loftus, Seaport Director, Toledo-Lucas Port Authority). In addition, the
Port of Boston has seen the 19.8 million short tons of cargo shipped in 1984 decline to
17.8 million tons in 1994. Tax Drives Firms to Canadian Ports, Exporters Trucking Goods
North, PATRIOT LEDGER, May 2, 1995, at 5.
According to Steven McCoy, President of the North American Export Grain Associ-
ation, "[t]he cumulative impact on U.S. agricultural exports of the various taxes which
are the subject of today's hearing could be to increase the cost of exporting U.S. agri-
cultural products by some US$45 million this year, discouraging such exports and low-
ering farm income." Cumulative Impact of Taxes and Various Fees Levied on the Maritime
Industry: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Oversights and Investigations, House Merchant
Marine and Fisheries Committee, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 153 (May 23, 1991) [hereinafter
McCoy Statement] (prepared statement of Steven A. McCoy, President, North American
Export Grain Association). Likewise, Eastman Kodak, a Rochester, New York based cor-
poration, will face HMT charges of approximately US$1.5 million on its cargo ship-
ments. Nicky Robertshaw, Shippers Exit N.Y. Port to Avoid Higher Taxes, CRAIN'S N.Y. Bus.,
Oct. 14, 1991, at 1.
17. United States Shoe Corp. v. United States,' 17 I.T.R.D. (BNA) 1281 (Ct. Int'l
Trade Feb. 15. 1995) (establishing U.S. Shoe Corp. v. U.S. as lead case in HMT litigation
and granting permission to numerous other exporters to act as amici curiae and file
briefs in support of plaintiff's motion). The amici curiae include some of the largest
corporations in the United States, including: Baxter Healthcare Corp. (No. 94-10-
00650), Chevron Chemical Co. (No. 95-01-00116), Ford Motor Co. (No. 95-01-00092),
Microsoft Corp. (No. 95-01-00120), Pillsbury Co. (No. 95-01-00121), and Xerox Corp.
(No. 94-10-00654). Id. at 1282-84.
18. 28 U.S.C. §§ 251-57 (1994) (defining Court of International Trade ("CIT")).
As an Article III court, the CIT maintains exclusive jurisdiction over civil actions dealing
with international trade law. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1581-85 (1994).
19. 907 F. Supp. 408 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1995).
20. US. Shoe, 907 F. Supp. at 408.
21. Id. at 418.
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U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit ("Federal Cir-
cuit") .22
This Comment argues that the recently decided case of U.S.
Shoe should be upheld by the Federal Circuit upon review be-
cause allowing the continued imposition of the HMT would ad-
versely affect the U.S. export industry and subject the Govern-
ment to possible North American Free Trade Agreement
("NAFTA") violations. Part I provides background information
regarding Congress' commerce and taxation powers. Part I also
analyzes the constitutional restrictions on taxation and presents
the judicial interpretations of the Export Clause and Import-Ex-
port Clause. Part I then describes the CIT and how it functions.
Next, Part I presents a review of NAFTA and U.S.-Canada trade
relations. Finally, Part I introduces background information on
the HMT and Harbor Maintenance Trust Fund 23 ("Trust Fund"),
and examines the problems surrounding this tax and the dis-
putes leading to the U.S. Shoe holding. Part II analyzes the CIT's
decision in U.S. Shoe. Part III argues that U.S. Shoe was correctly
decided by the CIT, and that the traditional approach to Export
Clause analysis should be upheld and applied in the future. This
Comment concludes that U.S. Shoe should be upheld in order to
preserve the success of maritime trade between U.S. and Cana-
dian ports, the competitiveness of U.S. ports, and the validity of a
well-established Supreme Court precedent.
I. BACKGROUND TO U.S. SHOE v. UNITED STATES
The Constitution grants the Federal Government the right
to govern commerce 4 and to tax in order to raise revenue for
22. U.S. Shoe, 907 F. Supp. 408, appeal filed, (No. 94-11-00668) (Fed. Cir. Jan. 31,
1996).
23. 26 U.S.C § 9505 (1994). The Trust Fund acts as a fund to support and organ-
ize the Federal financing of the operations and maintenance of U.S. ports and harbors.
H.R. Pr. No. 228, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1985). The Trust Fund collects money
from the HMT, tolls collected from the Saint Lawrence Seaway Development Corpora-
tion and from interest earned on the proceeds of the Trust Fund. 26 U.S.C.
§ 9505(a)(1), (2), (3) (1994). Expenditures from the Trust Fund are appropriated ac-
cording to U.S.C § 9505(c) (1994). 26 U.S.C. § 9602(b) (3) (1994). The U.S. Secretary
of the Treasury operates the Trust Fund, along with all other trust funds, and reports to
Congress each year on the financial condition and results of operation of the Trust
Fund for the past fiscal year and for the next five fiscal years. 26 U.S.C. § 9602(a)
(1994).
24. U.S. CONsr. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
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the support of the Government.2 5 To protect and encourage
foreign trade,2 6 the adopters of the Constitution placed restric-
tions on these two powers, namely the Export Clause which pro-
hibits taxation upon exports. 27 Similarly, in 1993, the U.S. Gov-
ernment entered into the North American Free Trade Agree-
ment2 8 ("NAFTA") to further ensure the success of the United
States in the foreign marketplace.2 9 Despite this, Congress en-
acted the HMT which damages export trade ° by placing a tax
upon loading or unloading of commercial cargo to be exported
out of U.S. ports.31 The CIT will determine if the HMT, as en-
acted, does violate the Export Clause and in turn undermine the
policies aimed toward successful foreign trade.32
A. Constitutional Powers of Commerce and Taxation
Section 8, Article I of the U.S. Constitution specifies the
powers granted exclusively to Congress.3 3 Among these are the
power of taxation 4 and the power to regulate commerce.3 5 Sec-
tion 9 addresses the limitations on these powers, 36 and includes
the Export Clause prohibition against export taxes.3 7 Section 10
establishes both inherent limitations on state powers and restric-
25. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
26. See supra notes 9-10 and accompanying text (discussing role of Export Clause
in foreign trade relations)
27. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 5.
28. Canada-Mexico-United States: North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec.
17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 289 (1993) (entered into forceJan. 1, 1994) [hereinafter NAFTA].
29. Dean C. Alexander, The North American Free Trade Agreement: An Overview, 11
INT'L TAX & Bus. LAW. 48, 48-49 (1993).
30. See supra note 16 (illuminating economic problems created by HMT).
31. 26 U.S.C. § 4461(a) (1994).
32. U.S. Shoe, 907 F. Supp. at 410.
33. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. Article I, § 8 declares that "Congress shall have the
power to .... " Id.; EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE CONSTITUTION AND WHAT IT MEANS TODAY
38 (Harold W. Chase & Craig R. Ducat eds., 14th ed. 1978) ("This is one of the most
important sections of the Constitution since it describes, for the most part, the field
within which Congress may exercise its legislative power.").
34. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. ("The Congress shall have Power To lay and col-
lect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common
Defence and general Welfare of the United States . . ").
35. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 ("To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among
the several States, and with the Indian Tribes . . ").
36. J.W. PELTASON, CORWIN & PELTASON'S UNDERSTANDING THE CONSTITUTION 80
(10th ed. 1985) ("Whereas Section 8 enumerates the legislative powers of the national
government, Section 9 limits them.").
37. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 5.
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tions imposed by the extent of the Federal Government's powers
set out in Section 8. According to the Import-Export Clause,
states are also prohibited from placing taxes on exported
goods.38
1. The Power of Commerce and Its Restrictions
The Commerce Clause3 9 of the Constitution provides Con-
gress with the power to regulate commerce within the United
States and with foreign countries.4" This commerce power al-
lows Congress to regulate interstate transactions that cannot be
regulated by the individual states, who possess limited jurisdic-
tion and power.41 Congress' power extends to state functions if
they involve foreign nations or if they affect more than one
state.4" The Supreme Court has defined commerce to include
all forms of commercial intercourse, transportation, and com-
munication carried on between nations and states within na-
tions.43
The Constitution grants Congress the power to regulate
commerce through prescription of the rules used to govern this
commerce.' This power entails employing any procedures or
methods Congress considers necessary and appropriate to carry
out and implement the governing rules that it seeks to estab-
lish.45 This commerce power is unlimited as long as the adopted
rules do not infringe on any prohibitions set forth in the Consti-
tution, 6 such as the provision that no money shall be drawn
from the Treasury unless properly appropriated4 7 or that no
preferences shall be given to the ports of one state over an-
38. Id. art. I, § 10, cl. 2 ("No State shall, without the Consent of the Congress, lay
any Imposts or Duties on Imports or Exports ... .
39. Id. art. I, § 8, ci. 3.
40. Id.
41. CORWIN, supra note 33, at 47.
42. PELTASON, supra note 36, at 63.
43. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 189-95 (1824); Brown v. State of
Maryland, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 419 (1827).
44. Rodgers v. United States, 138 F.2d 992, 994 (6th Cir. 1943).
45. Rodgers, 138 F.2d at 994.
46. Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 196; Rodgers, 138 F.2d at 994. According to the Court in
Gibbons, the commerce power is "complete in itself, may be exercised to its utmost ex-
tent, and acknowledges no limitations, other than are prescribed in the constitution."
Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 196.
47. U.S. CONSr. art. I, § 9, cl. 7.
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other.4 8
The Export Clause signifies another constitutional prohibi-
tion that restricts Congress' commerce power.4 9 The Export
Clause does not limit Congress' commerce power in a general
sense,5" but restricts the taxing power of Congress to raise reve-
nue within its commerce function.51 The restriction applies to
revenue-raising measures only and does not affect measures
taken in the normal regulation of commerce.52 The Export
Clause restricts the application of the Commerce Clause in a lim-
ited manner by prohibiting Congress from adopting methods of
regulation incorporating export taxes.53
2. The Power of Taxation
Government taxation raises revenue for certain governmen-
tal purposes54 by appropriating portions of money from the pub-
lic. 5 5 Taxation represents a function essential to the survival of
government and may, therefore, be exercised legitimately upon
all property and persons under the authority of the Govern-
ment.56 A government needs revenue to support its functions,
48. Id. art. I, § 9, cl. 6. ("No Preference shall be given by any Regulation of Com-
merce or Revenue to the Ports of one State over those of another.").
49. Id. art. I, § 9, cl. 5.
50. Moon v. Freeman, 379 F.2d 382, 390 (9th Cir. 1967).
51. Moon, 379 F.2d at 390.
52. Rodgers, 138 F.2d at 994. A minimal charge imposed by Congress strictly as part
of a plan of regulation does not violate the Export Clause. Id. A charge established to
raise revenue above and beyond its regulatory purpose does violate the Export Clause.
Id. In Rodgers, the Court held a charge imposed by Congress for production of cotton
above set marketing quotas constitutionally valid. Id. at 994-95. The Court noted that
"imposition with which we are here concerned has for its object the fostering, protect-
ing and conserving of interstate commerce and the prevention of harm to the people
from its flow .... It is not a charge on property for the purpose of raising revenue." Id.
at 995. Similarly, in Moon, the Court ruled that the required purchase of export certifi-
cates for wheat production as part of a wheat allocation program did not constitute a
tax in violation of the Export Clause. Moon, 379 F.2d at 383. The purpose of the wheat
allocation program was to "induce producers to comply with crop controls, and to regu-
late the price of wheat reaching both domestic and foreign markets." Id. at 392. In
addition, the Court noted that the wheat allocation program by not generating substan-
tial amounts of revenue did not implicate any constitutional taxation restrictions. Id.
53. Brown, 425 U.S. at 412-23; accord Rodgers, 138 F.2d at 994 (stating that Congress
may impose monetary sanctions under Commerce Clause as long as they do not levy
taxes to raise revenue).
54. Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 199.
55. 1 THOMAS M. COOLEY, TREATISE ON THE LAw OF TAXATION 2 n.1 (1903).
56. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 428 (1819); 1 COOLEY, supra
note 55, at 9.
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and taxation provides the mechanism to produce these reve-
nues. 57 A government possesses the power of taxation as a neces-
sary result of its sovereign authority and may impose taxes upon
all subjects over which the government's control extends, 5' but
only to support public purposes.59
The U.S. Constitution grants Congress the authority to im-
pose and collect taxes for the U.S. Government. 60 These taxes
provide for the common defense and general welfare of the
country.6' The power of taxation extends over all persons and
real property subject to the control of the legislative branch of
the Government.6" The Federal Government in the nineteenth
century derived most of its revenue from levying indirect taxes,6"
such as duties on imports and excise and stamp taxes on manu-
facturers.64 Today, a large portion of government revenue
comes from the national income tax.65
Congress' power of taxation can be exercised in its own
right without reference to Congress' other powers.6 6 The power
of taxation acts as an addition to the other enumerated congres-
sional powers and not as a supplement to them.6 7 The Govern-
ment may impose taxes for the purpose of raising revenue to
57. THE FEDERALIST No. 30, at 132 (Alexander Hamilton) (New ed. 1857). Hamil-
ton stated that a general power of taxation must be included in the framework of the
U.S. Government and this power is requisite to any written constitution. Id. As Hamil-
ton notes, "money is . . . considered as the vital principle of the body politic, as that
which sustains its life and motion and enables it to perform its most essential functions."
Id.
58. McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 429.
59. 1 COOLEY, supra note 55, at 181.
60. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. The power of taxation was considered "vital" and
"essential" to the new form of government being established at the Constitutional Con-
vention, without this power, "[a]ny Government of any description is helpless." WAR-
REN, supra note 5, at 465.
61. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1; Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 199.
62. 1 COOLEY, supra note 55, at 9.
63. Id. at 10-11. Indirect taxes refer to duties, impost, and excises placed upon
goods in commerce before they reach the consumer and are paid as part of market
price of the good and not as a tax. Id.
64. Id. at 11.
65. U.S. CONST. amend. XVI. Individual income taxes account for 39% of total
receipts by the U.S. Government. OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, EXECUTIVE OF-
FICE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, FISCAL YEAR 1996-BUDGET OF THE UNITED
STATES GOVERNMENT 2 (1996). This accounted for approximately US$525.1 billion and
US$551.9 billion towards the U.S. Government's budget in 1995 and 1996, respectively.
Id.
66. PELTASON, supra note 36, at 59.
67. Id.
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support the Government generally or a particular branch of the
Government.6 8 The power of taxation also allows Congress to
tax in order to support the programs it undertakes to regulate
under the Commerce Clause.6 9
Notwithstanding this power, the power to lay taxes to raise
revenue remains distinct and separate from the power to adopt
legislative programs that raise money to regulate commerce.7 °
In 1964, for example, Congress as part of the Agricultural Act of
1964,7' required the purchase of export certificates for wheat
produced for exportation. 7 The Court in Moon v. Freeman73 up-
held the export certificate requirement, concluding that the
price paid for these certificates was a legitimate charge under
Congress' commerce power because the purpose of the agricul-
tural program was not to raise revenue but to encourage wheat
producers to comply with industry quotas and to regulate the
price of wheat to both domestic and foreign markets. 74 Simi-
larly, in Augusta Towing Co., Inc. v. United States,75 the United
States Claims Court upheld a tax upon vessels engaged in com-
mercial transportation on any of twenty-six enumerated inland
or intracoastal waterways. 76 The Claims Court found the tax to
be a fee imposed for the purpose of compensating the Govern-
ment for the benefits supplied for improving the inland water-
way system, and not a tax imposed to raise revenue.77
The power granted to Congress to levy taxes does not
abridge the rights of the States to levy taxes.7 8 States, like the
Federal Government, need revenue in order to support their
government.79 The power of taxation in the hands of the indi-
vidual States is also essential to their existence.8" By prohibiting
the States from imposing taxes on imports and exports, the Con-
68. Rodgers, 138 F.2d at 995.
69. PELTASON, supra note 36, at 59.
70. Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 198-202; Rodgers, 138 F.2d at 995.
71. Agricultural Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-297, § 101, 78 Stat. 173, 178-79 (codi-
fied at 7 U.S.C. § 1349 (1994)).
72. Id.
73. 379 F.2d 382 (9th Cir. 1967).
74. Moon, 379 F.2d at 392.
75. 5 CI. Ct. 160 (1984).
76. 26 U.S.C. § 4042(a) (1994); 33 U.S.C. §§ 1802, 1804 (1994).
77. Augusta Towing, 5 Cl. Ct. at 167.
78. McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 428; Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 198.
79. Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 199.
80. Id.
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stitution impliedly grants the States the power to tax everything
else.8 The power to tax all articles other than imports and ex-
ports exists in both the Federal Government and the state gov-
ernments. 82 Following from this, a state can tax those persons or
property over which its authority extends for the purpose83 of
raising revenue to support state functions.84
B. Constitutional Restrictions on Power of Taxation
The congressional power to lay taxes is very broad, limited
by one restriction and two qualifications contained in the Consti-
tution.85 The first qualification instructs the Government to levy
indirect taxes uniformly86 throughout the United States.87 The
Government must also levy direct taxes88 in proportion to the
census or any other numerical system established by Congress.8 9
Lastly, Congress cannot impose taxes upon exports.90 The limi-
tations on Congress' taxation power relate specifically to revenue
raising and not to incidental revenue gains obtained while per-
forming other congressional duties such as commercial regula-
tion.9 Aside from these limitations, the power of Congress is
extensive and may be exercised at will within the discretion of
Congress.92
1. The Export Clause
The Export Clause of the U.S. Constitution prohibits the
Federal Government from placing a tax or duty upon articles
exported from any state. 9 Although originally sanctioned as a
81. THE FEDERALIST No. 32, at 141 (Alexander Hamilton) (New ed. 1857).
82. Id.
83. McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 429.
84. Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 199.
85. License Tax Cases (United States v. Vassar), 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 462, 471 (1866).
86. Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U.S. 41 (1900). The uniformity requirement refers to
geographical uniformity and means to "[olperate generally throughout the United
States." Knowlton, 178 U.S. at 769.
87. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
88. 1 COOLEY, supra note 55, at 10. Direct taxes are imposed directly on the per-
son, property, business, or income of the individual responsible for paying them. Id.
89. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 4.
90. Id. art. I., § 9, cl. 5.
91. Rodgers, 138 F.2d at 995.
92. License Tax Cases, 72 U.S. at 462.
93. Id. art. I, § 9, cl. 5. ("No Tax or Duty shall be laid on articles exported from any
State.").
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protection for interstate commerce,94 the use of the word "ex-
ported" in the Constitution is now interpreted as referring to
shipment of goods between the United States and foreign coun-
tries.95 The Export Clause, therefore, prevents federal taxation
on exports from any state in the United States to a non-U.S.
country.96
a. The General Export Clause Restriction
The Supreme Court in Fairbanks set the standard for a
broad interpretation of the Export Clause.97 The Court stated
that the Export Clause protects all exportation from the burdens
of national taxation.98 It followed, therefore, that this freedom
extended not only to exported articles themselves, but to the ex-
94. Fairbank v. United States, 181 U.S. 282, 292-94 (1901). The drafters of the
Constitution initially adopted the Export Clause to prevent taxation from creating bur-
dens upon the exportation of goods from Southern states. SAMUEL FREEMAN MILLER,
LECTURES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 592 (1983) [hereinafter MILLER
ON THE CONSTITUTION]. The drafters adopted the provision in response to the fears of
the Southern states that the Northern states would unduly burden exports out of the
South. 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 6, at 359 (highlighting de-
bate between delegates regarding taxation and export clause). The South felt that pro-
tection against undue tax burdens was not something they could entrust to the North.
Id. at 305, 359. Mr. Mason of Virginia, in fact, "urged the necessity of connecting with
the power of levying taxes duties &c, that no tax should be laid on exports .... He was
unwilling to trust to its being done in a future article. He hoped the Northn. States did
not mean to deny the Southern this security." Id. at 305. Protecting the Southern states
from abusive taxation by the Government or the Northern states constituted one of the
key reasons for adopting export tax restrictions in the Constitution. 2 RECORDS OF THE
FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 6, at 305, 359; See supra note 85 (depicting debate
over export taxes at Constitutional Convention).
95. Woodruff v. Parham, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 123 (1868).
96. Fairbank, 181 U.S. at 283. Even though the Export Clause is a restriction on
congressional powers, courts should construe it to the full extent expressed in its lan-
guage. Id. at 300. The Supreme Court in Fairbank concluded that:
Constitutional provisions, whether operating by way of grant or limitation, are
to be enforced according to their letter and spirit, and cannot be evaded by
legislation which, though not in terms trespassing on the letter, yet in sub-
stance and effect destroy the grant or limitation.
Id. The Court drew a comparison between constitutional grants of powers and constitu-
tional restrictions. Id. at 289. The Court indicated that granted powers are to be taken
very broadly and Congress is to be given the room necessary to utilize and put those
poweres into effect. Id. The Court concluded, it is only logical to derive from constitu-
tional interpretation that restrictions on Congress' powers should be given this same
broad approach. Id. As Justice Brewer recognized, "[i]t would be a strange rule of
construction that language granting powers be liberally construed and that language of
restriction is to be narrowly and technically construed." Id.
97. Id. at 283.
98. Id. at 292-93.
1996] U.S. SHOE CORP. v. UNITED STATES 1775
portation process99 as well. 10 0
A tax violates the Export Clause if Congress places the tax
upon exported goods.101 For analysis under the Export Clause, a
court needs to determine whether or not the tax is levied upon
exported goods.102 If Congress imposes a tax upon exported
goods, then the goods are immune from taxation.10 3  The
Supreme Court seeks to determine whether an item is exported
as the term is used in the Export Clause, and should be free
from taxation.
10 4
b. Tax Levied Upon Exported Goods
The first test examines whether the goods are in the actual
process of being exported and have begun their journey to a
non-U.S. destination. 5  In Turpin v. Burgess,10 6 the Supreme
Court ruled on the constitutionality of a tobacco exportation
stamp used to distinguish tobacco intended for exportation in
order to protect the government from exporters looking to
avoid the tax.1 7 In Turpin,'t 8 Congress imposed this stamp tax
on tobacco before the tobacco had left the factory and did not
take into account that the tobacco may not have been ex-
ported.0 9 The tax fell upon tobacco intended for exportation
99. A.G. Spalding v. Edwards, 285 F. 784, 785 (S.D.N.Y. 1922). The term "process
of exportation" represents the steps involved in export trade. A.G. Spalding, 285 F. at
785. Export trade involves the process of carrying or sending goods abroad. Thomp-
son v. United States, 141 U.S. 471, 477 (1892).
100. Fairbank, 181 U.S. at 292-93. As the Court stated, "if all exports must be free
from national tax or duty, such freedom requires not simply an omission of a tax upon
the article exported, but also a freedom from any tax which directly burdens the expor-
tation." Id. at 293.
101. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, ci. 5.
102. See Turpin v. Burgess, 117 U.S. 504, 507 (1886) (noting that imposing tax
upon goods by reason of their exportation or while they are being exported is laying tax
on exported goods); Fairbank, 181 U.S. at 283 (answering question of whether tax on
foreign bill of lading is tax imposed upon exports).
103. See Cornell v. Coyne, 192 U.S. 418, 427 (1904) (holding that goods manufac-
tured for exportation are not exported goods while still in warehouse); A.G. Spalding v.
Edwards, 262 U.S. 66 (1923) (holding that goods delivered to carrier are exported
goods because exporter has taken first step to transport goods across sea).
104. U.S. Shoe, 907 F. Supp. at 417.
105. Cornell, 192 U.S. at 428.
106. 117 U.S. 504 (1886).
107. Turpin, 117 U.S. at 504.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 507. The Court reasoned that these goods were still in the factory and
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and not tobacco presently being exported. 110 The Court con-
cluded that the Export Clause prohibited taxes on goods being
exported, and not ones intended for export.1 The Court,
therefore, found the stamp tax to be outside the constitutional
prohibition against export taxes.' 12
Following Turpin, 1 3 the Supreme Court adopted the same
reasoning in Cornell v. Coyne,' 14 and found a nondiscriminatory
tax'1 5 placed on manufactured cheese to be constitutionally
valid. " 6 Even though some of the manufactured cheese would
be exported, the Court held that the tax exemption attaches to
exported goods and not to articles prior to exportation. 17 The
Court upheld the validity of this tax because it taxed the pre-
exportation manufacturing of the cheese and not the exporta-
tion itself.1 1
Finally, in A. G. Spalding & Bros. v. Edwards, 19 the Supreme
Court distinguished the line between goods intended for export
and those already undergoing the process of exportation.1 2 In
may have never been exported anywhere. Id. It cannot be a tax on exports before the
goods leave the factory and become exports. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id. The Court concluded that a general tax laid on all tobacco, whether or
not the tobacco was in the process of exportation, or intended for exportation could
not violate the Constitution. Id. The Export Clause was meant to apply to taxes upon
exported goods directly, not by virtue of applying a general tax that happened to cover
some exported goods. Id. It is this rationale that laid the groundwork for the Supreme
Court decisions to follow in Coyne, Hvoslef, and Thames & Mersey. Coyne, 192 U.S. at 418
(holding tax on all manufactured cheese for export valid because it taxed the manufac-
turing of cheese and not exportation of cheese); United States v. Hvoslef, 237 U.S. 1
(1915) (declaring tax on charter parties negotiated for exportation of goods by vessel
invalid because it targeted and taxed goods while they were being exported); Thames &
Mersey Marine Ins. Co. v. United States, 237 U.S. 19 (1915) (invalidating tax on marine
risk insurance policies because tax essentially fell upon policies covering goods being
exported).
112. Turpin, 117 U.S. at 506.
113. Id. at 504.
114. Cornell, 192 U.S. at 418.
115. Id. at 428. The Government assesses a nondiscriminatory tax by placing it on
all property and not on specific types of goods. Id.
116. Id. at 418. The tax in question was placed upon all filled cheese manufac-
tured in the United States. Id. at 426. By subjecting all filled cheese that was manufac-
tured to taxation, Congress did not single out exports and, in effect, was only taxing the
manufacturing of the cheese and not its export. Id. at 427-28.
117. Id. at 427.
118. Cornell, 192 U.S. at 427-28.
119. 262 U.S. 66 (1923).
120. Spalding, 262 U.S. at 66. At the point when goods are no longer intended for
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Spalding,121 Congress levied a tax upon all baseball bats and balls
sold by the manufacturer, producer, or importer. 12 2 A.G. Spald-
ing, a baseball bat manufacturer, sold and delivered baseball
bats to Scholtz & Co., a shipping merchant, who in turn would
ship the bats to Venezuela to complete a sale to a Venezuelan
company.12 3 The Supreme Court ruled that once the goods
were delivered to the carrier, Scholtz, and title passed to that
carrier, the goods were in the process of exportation and subject
to the Export Clause prohibitions. 12 4 The delivery of goods in
Spalding committed the goods to the carrier for the set purpose
of exporting them across the sea 125 and was the first step in the
process of moving the bats to a port for shipment to Vene-
zuela. 12 6 The time of delivery represents the point of distinction
from the pre-exportation activities at issue in Cornell and Turpin,
and signifies the point when the Export Clause prohibitions ap-
ply to the tax at issue.1 27
c. Tax Levied Close to Value of Exported Goods
The second test seeks to determine if the statute assesses the
tax upon an article or document closely related to the value of
the exported goods.128 The Supreme Court in Thames & Mersey
Marine Insurance Co. v. U.S.,1 29 held that a tax upon an article or
export but begin the process of exportation, they are immune from taxation. Id. at 69.
Before this, the goods are in the process of manufacture and subject to taxation. Id.; see
Cornell, 192 U.S. at 418 (holding that manufactured cheese was not exported good
while it remains in warehouse). After this point, the process of exportation has begun
and the goods are immune from taxation. Spalding, 262 U.S. at 69.
121. Spalding, 262 U.S. at 66.
122. Id. at 68. The tax was passed under the War Revenue Act of October 3, 1917
and provided that a tax was to be placed "upon all ... baseball bats .... balls of all kinds
... sold by the manufacturer, producer, or importer." War Revenue Act of 1917, Pub.
L. No. 65-50, § 600(0, 40 Stat. 300, 316 (Oct. 3, 1917).
123. Spalding, 262 U.S. at 68.
124. Id. at 69. The Court stated that to put the distinguishing point when the
goods were committed to exportation any later in time would deprive the exports of
their constitutional protection. Id. at 70.
125. Id. at 69.
126. Id. The Court further recognized that, even though "further acts were to be
done before the goods would get to sea does not matter so long as they were only the
regular steps to the contemplated result." Id. at 69-70.
127. Spalding, 262 U.S. at 69.
128. U.S. Shoe, 907 F. Supp. at 418.
129. Thames & Mersey, 237 U.S. at 19.
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good so directly and closely related13 0 to the process of exporta-
tion is a tax on the exported goods themselves.13 1  In other
words, the Export Clause protects the goods and any related
items essential to the exportation process from the burden of
taxation."3 2 This view follows from the principle articulated by
the Supreme Court in Pace v. Burgess 3 3 and Fairbank:13 4 that leg-
islation cannot attempt to indirectly accomplish what the Consti-
tution explicitly prohibits.13 5
The Supreme Court used this theory to expand the reach of
the Export Clause beyond the goods themselves and held that
taxes imposed upon bills of lading are in violation of the Consti-
tution.3 6  In 1860, the State of California passed a law that
placed a stamp tax upon the bill of lading of any gold or silver
leaving the state.1 37 In Almy v. California, 1 8 the Supreme Court
reasoned that a bill of lading 3 9 is so closely associated with every
item of cargo exported that a tax upon this bill was in effect a tax
upon the item of cargo itself. 4° The Court, therefore held that
a tax upon a bill of lading was in substance the same as a tax
upon the article being shipped. 4'
Following Almy,' 42 the Supreme Court in Fairbank 43 relied
130. Id. at 26. Directly and closely related could be defined as an item that by
.virtue of the demands of commerce, [is] an integral part of the exportation." Id.
131. Id. at 25.
132. Id.
133. 92 U.S. 372 (1875).
134. Fairbank, 181 U.S. at 282.
135. Id. The Supreme Court in Pace warned that we need to guard against the
danger of imposing duties under the pretext of a fee and need to regard "things rather
than names." Pace, 92 U.S. at 376. The Supreme Court in Fairbank noted that, "what
cannot be done directly because of constitutional restriction cannot be accomplished
indirectly by legislation which accomplishes the same result." Fairbank, 181 U.S. at 294.
136. SeeAlmy v. California, 65 U.S. 169 (1860) (holding that tax on bill of lading is
tax on exports); Fairbank, 181 U.S. at 283 (concluding that tax on foreign bill of lading
effectively taxes exports).
137. Almy, 65 U.S. at 169.
138. Id.
139. Hvoslef, 237 U.S. at 17. A bill of lading is a contract for the carriage of a
particular set of goods occupying a limited area of cargo space aboard a vessel. Id.
140. Almy, 65 U.S. at 174. "A bill of lading therefore, or some equivalent instru-
ment of writing, is invariably associated with every cargo of merchandise exported to a
foreign country, and consequently a duty upon that is, in substance and effect, a duty
on the article exported." Id.
141. Id. The Court stated that "although differing in form from duty on the article
shipped, [a tax or duty on a bill of lading] is in substance the same thing." Id.
142. Almy, 65 U.S. at 169.
143. Fairbank, 181 U.S. at 283.
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heavily on the rationale of Almy'" to strike down as unconstitu-
tional a federal stamp tax on foreign bills of lading. 4 ' The
Court reiterated the proposition that a tax on a bill of lading
confirming the exported articles burdens the exportation pro-
cess just as a tax placed directly on the exported articles them-
selves.' 46 The Court chracterized the tax upon the foreign bill of
lading as revenue raising 147 and equivalent to a tax upon the
articles included in the bill of lading. 4 The Court further ob-
served that Congress taxed export bills of lading ten times as
much as ordinary bills of lading and this demonstrated an at-
tempt to burden exports with a discriminatory and excessive
tax.149 The Court therefore held that the stamp tax burdened
the exportation of the articles and violated the Export Clause
prohibition against taxation. 150
In United States v. Hvoslef,15 1 the Supreme Court continued
to redefine the broad reach of the Export Clause by holding a
tax on charter parties' 52 for the carriage of cargo to non-U.S.
ports unconstitutional.1 5 3 The charter party in this case covered
the complete cargo of a vessel as opposed to a bill of lading,
which covered specific goods on the vessel. 154 According to the
Court, this distinction should not, and does not, matter constitu-
tionally. 55 The charter parties were negotiated solely for the
purpose of exportation.1 56 The charter parties were also related
144. Almy, 65 U.S. at 169.
145. Fairbank, 181 U.S. at 283.
146. Id. at 293.
147. Id. at 305.
148. Id. at 312.
149. Fairbank, 181 U.S. at 290.
150. Id. at 312.
151. Hvoslef, 237 U.S. at 1.
152. Id. at 16-17. A charter party is a contract for the lease of a vessel or for special
services rendered by the owner of the vessel. Id. at 16. When the owner of the ship
arranges to carry cargo for the charterer to a designated destination, the charter party
acts as a contract for the shipment of that cargo. Id. In Hvoslef, the U.S. Government
attempted to impose a tax upon certain charter parties under the War Revenue Act of
June 13, 1898. Id. at 7. The Court held that this tax violated the Export Clause because
a tax on charter parties was so closely associated to the process of exportation that it
essentially taxed the exported goods and acted as a prohibited burden on exportation.
Id. at 17.
153. Id. at 17-18.
154. Id. at 16-17.
155. Hvoslef, 237 U.S. at 17.
156. Id.
17791996]
1780 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAWJOURNAL [Vol. 19:1764
exclusively to the negotiated service of exporting goods. 1 57 A
nondiscriminatory tax applied to export charter parties is so
closely related to the process of exportation and the exported
goods, and therefore it constitutes a tax upon exportation and
exported goods.' 58
Two weeks after Hvoslef,'59 the Supreme Court in Thames
and Mersey Marine Insurance Co. v. United States,'6 ° determined the
constitutionality of a tax applied to marine insurance policies
covering exported goods against marine voyage risks. 6 As in
Hvoslef,162 the question remained whether the marine insurance
policies covering marine risks during voyage were so vitally con-
nected 61 with the export process that a tax upon them was in
essence a tax on the exported goods. 164 The Court answered in
the affirmative.1 65 By analyzing the business of exportation, the
Court concluded that virtually every shipping contract required
marine insurance 66 as necessary to protect one's property when
exporting cargo.' 67 Marine insurance is so essential to the ex-
portation process that a tax upon the policy may properly be
considered a tax upon the exported goods themselves. 68
In 1995, the Federal Circuit, in International Business Ma-
chines Corp ("IBM") v. United States,'69 assured the continuing va-
lidity of the broad view of the Export Clause 7 ° by invalidating a
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Hvoslef, 237 U.S. at 1.
160. Thames & Mersey, 237 U.S. at 19.
161. Id. at 22.
162. Hvoslef, 237 U.S. at 1.
163. Thames &Mersey, 237 U.S. at 25-26. As used by the Supreme Court, "so vitally
connected" refers to how essential and close to the process of exportation the insurance
policies were. Id.
164. Id. The Court pointed out that it was not dealing with activities in anticipa-
tion of exportation, in which case the tax would be valid, but, rather with activities
directly relating to the exportation itself. Id.
165. Id. at 26.
166. Id. The Court illustrated this by referring to a "C.I.F." contract to ship cargo.
Id. A C.I.F. contract includes a price negotiated according to cost, insurance, and
freight. Id. The C.I.F. requires the shipper to forward to the exporter, or shippee, a
bill of lading and an insurance policy. Id.
167. Thames & Mersey, 237 U.S. at 26.
168. Id.
169. International Business Machines Corp. v. United States, 59 F.3d 1234 (Fed.
Cir. 1995), cert. granted, 116 S.Ct. 594 (Dec. 8, 1995) [hereinafter IBM].
170. Id. at 1239. The Federal Circuit admitted that the Supreme Court may over-
rule Thames & Mersey and the traditional approach to the Export Clause. Id. The court
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tax upon non-U.S. issued insurance policies relating to goods in
export.171 In IBM v. U.S.,' 72 Section 4371 of the Internal Reve-
nue Code 173 authorized a tax upon each policy of casualty insur-
ance issued to a domestic company by a non-U.S. insurer to
cover risks or liabilities arising in the United States.1 74 The tax
attempted to minimize the advantage that non-U.S. insurers had
over their tax-liable domestic counterparts.1 7 5 In IBM v. U.S.,
non-U.S. IBM subsidiaries purchased insurance policies from
non-U.S. insurers to cover the risk of damage during the over-
seas exportation of their goods.1 76 Because the goods were be-
ing exported and the insurance policies were based upon the
value of these goods, the circuit court concluded that the tax
upon the policies functioned as a tax on goods in the process of
exportation.1 77 The circuit court, therefore, held the tax on
marine insurance policies to be a tax upon exported goods and
unconstitutional as a violation of the Export Clause.1 78
The Constitution also limits state taxation.1 79 These limita-
tions help to establish a viable federal system 80 and prevent
states from imposing independent policies that destroy federal
harmony.1 8' Additionally, some of the constitutional restrictions
on state taxation help foster succesful commercial relations with
reasoned, however, that "we do not feel free in this case to take the extraordinary step
of disregarding a higher court decision that all agree is binding precedent if still valid."
Id. The circuit court invited the Supreme Court to reconsider the Thames & Mersey
holding and with it the traditional analysis of the Export Clause. Id. On December 8,
1995, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to hear this case. IBM, 59 F.3d at 1234.
171. IBM, 59 F.3d at 1239.
172. Id. at 1235.
173. 26 U.S.C. § 4371 (1994). The Internal Revenue Code "provid[es] the statu-
tory mechanisms to raise revenues for the fulfillment of Federal, State, and local poli-
cies and programs... [and] also establish [es] priorities for the achievement of public
and private goals .... The result is a tax code determining not only the health, welfare,
and security of the entire nation but the standard of living of every person." 26
U.S.CA §§ 1-100, at V (1988 & West. Supp. 1995).
174. Id.
175. IBM, 59 F.3d at 1235; H.R. RE. No. 2333, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 61 (1942).
176. IBM, 59 F.3d at 1235.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 1237-39. The circuit court in IBM upheld the Thames &Mersey decision
and relied wholly on it in making their determination. Id.; see supra notes 160-68 and
accompanying text (reviewing Thames & Mersey holding).
179. PAULJ. HARTMAN, FEDERAL LIMITATIONS ON STATE AND LOCAL TAXATION § 1:1,
at 5 (1981).
180. Id.
181. Id. at 2.
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non-U.S. countries. 82 One of these limitations, the Import-Ex-
port Clause,1 83 prohibits states from levying taxes on imports and
exports.18
4
2. The Import-Export Clause
The Import-Export Clause of the Constitution prohibits
states from imposing taxes upon imported or exported goods.1 5
The drafters of the Constitution adopted the Import-Export
Clause in order to grant the Federal Government exclusive
power over import taxation and to prevent abuses of the taxa-
tion privilege by certain states situated against seaboards.18 6 The
traditional Import-Export Clause interpretation mirrored the
Export Clause approach.187 The Supreme Court in Michelin Tire
Corp. v. Wages' limited the breadth of the Import-Export
Clause by adopting a new approach based on the underlying pol-
icies of the clause.18 9
a. Traditional Analysis
Traditionally, in determining whether the prohibition ap-
plied in a particular case, the Supreme Court examined whether
the tax fell upon goods that were imports or exports in the
stream of foreign commerce. 9 The Supreme Court considered
a good an import if it still resembled an import and had not yet
become incorporated into the mass of property 91 in the state.
1 92
182. Id. at 7.
183. U.S. CONsT. art. 1, § 10, cl. 2.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. 3 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 6, at 518-19; 2 RECORDS
OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 6, at 441-42.
187. Department of Revenue v. Association of Washington Stevedoring Cos., 435
U.S. 734, 752 (1978). If Congress placed a tax upon goods in the process of exporta-
tion, then the tax violated the Export Clause. Spalding, 262 U.S. at 69. Similarly, if
Congress placed a tax upon goods in foreign commerce, then the tax violates the Im-
port-Export Clause. Almy, 65 U.S. at 169. The Court, in Washington Stevedoring, recog-
nized that the two tests were essentially the same and used Spalding as precedent for
early Import-Export Clause analysis. Washington Stevedoring, 435 U.S. at 752.
188. 423 U.S. 276 (1976).
189. Michelin, 423 U.S. at 276.
190. Low, 80 U.S. at 29; Almy, 65 U.S. at 169. The stream of foreign commerce
involves the shipment of articles of commerce from the ports of one country to those of
another. Almy, 65 U.S. at 174.
191. Brown, 25 U.S. at 440-45. The mass of property includes the property subject
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Courts employed the "original package" ' test to make this de-
termination.' 94 If the importer left the good in its original pack-
aging and did not use it or offer it for sale outside of this packag-
ing, the ruling court considered these goods imports and free
from taxation.1 95 The analysis applied by the courts for taxes
upon exports was the same as that applied in the Export Clause
cases.196 Thus, a tax fell upon exports if the goods had already
entered the stream of commerce and had begun their journey
out of the country. 19 7
b. Michelin Approach
In Michelin,'98 the Supreme Court established a new, nar-
rower approach 99 to the Import-Export Clause. 00 In holding a
nondiscriminatory ad valorem tax upon all tires and tubes consti-
tutionally valid, the Supreme Court in Michelin overruled Low v.
Austin °1 and adopted a new approach to Import-Export Clause
to state taxation and does not include property belonging to the individual importer.
Id.
192. Low, 80 U.S. at 30-31.
193. Brown, 25 U.S. at 441-42. The Court in Brown laid out the "orginal package"
test as follows:
It is sufficient for the present to say, generally, that when the importer has so
acted upon the thing imported, that it has become incorporated and mixed
up with the mass of proerty in the country, it has perhaps, lost its distinctive
character as an import and has become subject to the taxing power of the
State; but while remaining the property of the importer, in his warehouse, in
the original form of package in which it was imported, a tax upon it is too
plainly a duty on imports to escape the prohibition of the constitution.
Id.
194. Brown, 25 U.S. at 441-42.
195. Id.; MILLER ON THE CONSTITurION, supra note 94, at 591.
196. Turpin, 117 U.S. at 506; see supra notes 93-178 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing traditional export clause analysis).
197. See Turpin, 117 U.S. at 506 ("The prohibition.., has reference to the imposi-
tion of duties on goods by reason or because of their exportation or intended exporta-
tion .... "); Cornell, 192 U.S. at 427 ("The exemption attaches to the export and not the
article before its exportation.").
198. Michelin, 423 U.S. at 276.
199. Id. at 290-91. The Import-Export Clause does not act as broad restriction on
all taxation of imports and exports. Id. at 290. Rather, the Import-Export Clause nar-
rowly prohibits only imposts or duties, both of which have the characteristics of taxes
targeted towards imports or exports specifically. Id. at 290-91.
200. Id. at 276.
201. Low, 80 U.S. at 29. The Michelin Court overruled Low because it felt that the
court in Low had misread the words of Brown v. Mayland. Michelin, 423 U.S. at 282; see
supra note 193 and accompanying text (discussing use of Brown decision by Court in
Low). The Court noted that it did not believe that the ruling in Brown was meant to
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analysis.2 °2 The Court in Michelin departed from the traditional
analysis of whether an article was an import and thus subject to
taxation, 0 3 focusing instead on the underlying nature of the
tax. 214 The Michelin Court sought to determine, based upon the
include a nondiscriminatory ad valorem tax among the prohibited imposts or duties.
Michelin, 423 U.S. at 282. First, this was not the type of exaction that the Framers of the
Constitution were concerned about when they adopted this provision. Id. at 283. A
nondiscriminatory ad valorem tax would not hamper commerce or be used by seaboard
states to take advantage of the inland states that needed their ports for exportation or
importation. Id. at 286. It was also obvious to the Court that this type of tax would not
affect the most important goal of this provision: granting the Federal Government ex-
clusive control over non-domestic commerce. Id. An important characteristic of this
type of tax is that it cannot be "selectively imposed or increased" in order to damage
foreign importation. Id. at 288. Finally, a nondiscriminatory ad valorem property tax
would not impede or interfere with the free flow of goods between the States. Id.
The wording of the clause should be read to prohibit specifically imposts or duties
as opposed to general taxes. Id. at 290. Duties encompassed taxes imposed on the
goods themselves as well as the excise taxes laid on the importation process and the
documents associated with it. 1 COOLEY, supra note 55, at 6; 3 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL
CONVENTION, supra note 6, at 203-04. Imposts were duties, usually in the form of
stamps, laid on articles imported into the country. 1 COOLEY, supra note 55, at 6 n.6; 3
RECORDS OF FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 6, at 203-04. Taxes were general exac-
tions on persons, land, and property. 1 COOLEY, supra note 55, at 6 n. 4; 3 RECORDS OF
THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 6, at 203-04. The Court in Michelin recognized
that imposts or duties have the common characteristic of being directed to imported
goods and employed by the seaboard states to discriminate against the inland states.
Michelin, 423 U.S. at 292. The use of the words imposts or duties, therefore, suggests a
prohibition of exactions more specific than general taxes. Id. at 291.
The Michelin Court stated that the Court in Low compounded its mistake by mis-
reading Judge Taney's opinion in the License Cases. Id. at 299. Judge Taney used lan-
guage similar to that in Brown to uphold the proposition that an imported good is
immune from taxation if it is still in the hands of the importer, in its original packaging,
and not yet a part of the mass of property of the state. License Cases (Thurlow v.
Massachussetts), 46 U.S. (5 How.) 504, 575 (1847) ("goods imported, while they remain
in the hands of the importer, in the form and shape in which they were brought into
the country, can in no just sense be regarded as a part of that mass of property in the
State usually taxed for the support of the State government"). The Court in Low took
this language to support its holding that the prohibition covered any tax upon imports.
Id. at 300. The problem, as the Michelin Court pointed out, was thatJudge Taney con-
tinued his analysis and made it "crystal clear" that the prohibition applied only to taxes
upon imports still characterized as imports and not nondiscriminatory ad valorem prop-
erty taxes. Id. Given the above reasoning, the Michelin Court held that Low was wrongly
decided and overruled it. Id. at 301.
202. Michelin, 423 U.S. at 278.
203. Washington Stevedoring, 435 U.S. at 752. The Court noted that the Michelin
Court adopted a new approach to Import-Export Clause analysis by ignoring the ques-
tion of whether the tax was placed upon imports and focusing instead on the nature of
the tax as an impost or duty. Id.
204. Id. The Court in Michelin evaluated the tax to determine if it acted as an
impost or duty as used in the Import-Export Clause. Michelin, 423 U.S. at 290-91. The
words imposts or duties do not mean all taxation. Id. at 293. Only charges that create
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policies and purposes underlying the Import-Export Clause,
whether the charge was an impost or duty within the meaning of
the Import-Export Clause and not whether the charged was
placed upon an imported or exported good.2 0
The Import-Export Clause first seeks to ensure that the Fed-
eral Government speaks with one voice when regulating com.-
merce with non-U.S. governments. 20 6 Second, the Import-Ex-
port Clause assures that import revenues become a major source
of revenue to the Federal Government and prevents diversion of
this revenue to the States.2 7 Finally, the Import-Export Clause
maintains harmony among the States and protects against abuse
by seaboard states.2 8 According to the Court, an exaction that
offends any one of these three policies exemplifies a forbidden
impost or duty.20 9
The Michelin Court held that the tax in question had no
effect on the Federal Government's ability to regulate interna-
tional commerce.2 10 The Court noted that Congress could not
use a nondiscriminatory tax to selectively encourage or discour-
age importation or international trade.1 In addition, the tax
did not deprive the Government of any revenue to which it was
entitled.21 2 The tax in question covered the costs of state serv-
the evils that the Import-Export Clause intended to eliminate are considered imposts or
duties. Id. The Court evaluated the tax in question to determine if it created any of the
evils that the clause intended to protect against. Id. at 286-90.
205. Michelin, 423 U.S. at 286-90.
206. Id. at 285. James Madison in the Federalist No. 42 stated,
[T]he second class of powers, lodged in the general government, consists of
those which regulate the intercourse with foreign nations, to wit.., to regu-
late foreign commerce .... This class of powers forms an obvious and essen-
tial branch of the federal administration. If we are to be one nation in any
respect, it clearly ought to be in respect to other nations.
THE FEDERALIsr No. 42, at 193 (James Madison) (New ed. 1857).
207. Michelin, 423 U.S. at 285. According to Alexander Hamilton, "the greatest
part of the national revenue is derived from taxes of the indirect kind; from importers,
and from excises. Duties on imported articles form a large branch of this latter descrip-.
tion." THE FEDERALisT No. 12, at 55 (Alexander Hamilton)(1857).
208. Michelin, 423 U.S. at 285-86; 3 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, SUpra
note 6, at 519 (setting forth letter of James Madison to Professor Davis) (writing that
inland states should not be taxed for goods coming in or going out to foreign com-.
merce through coastal states).
209. Michelin, 423 U.S. at 285-87.
210. Id. at 286.
211. Id.
212. Id. at 286-87.
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ices and was not available to the Federal Government.2 13 Finally,
the nondiscriminatory ad valorem property tax did not hinder or
affect trade between the States.214 The Michelin Court held that
the Import-Export Clause protects against taxes levied upon im-
ported goods as they traveled from state to state and not against
a tax on property destined for and remaining in one state. 215
Consequently, the Michelin Court held that the nondiscrimina-
tory ad valorem property tax did not offend any of these poli-
cies. 2 16 The tax, therefore, did not violate the Import-Export
Clause of the Constitution, and could be considered a valid
tax.
21 7
Two years later in Department of Revenue v. Assoc. of Washing-
ton Stevedoring Cos.,28 the Supreme Court upheld the narrower
Michelin approach and applied it to exports under the Import-
Export Clause. 1 9 In Washington Stevedoring,22 ° the State of Wash-
ington applied a business and occupation tax upon stevedoring
activities. 221 The Supreme Court adapted the Michelin approach
to exports because the prohibitions of the Import-Export Clause
included restrictions on both export and import taxes.2 22 The
Court further reasoned that exports related directly to the first
and third policies identified in Michelin.2 3 First, the Federal
Government's control over foreign commerce involves the regu-
lation of export trade. 4 Second, exports also affect the harmo-
nization of interstate trade. 2 5 The Washington Stevedoring Court
reasoned that the second prong did not apply to exports because
the Federal Government cannot tax exports either, so a ban on
state export taxes would not be protecting the Government from
loss of any potential revenue. 226
213. Id.
214. Michelin, 423 U.S. at 288.
215. Id. at 290.
216. Id. at 293-94.
217. Id.
218. Washington Stevedoring, 435 U.S. at 734.
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. Id. at 736. Stevedoring is the business of loading and unloading cargo from
ships. Id. at 737.
222. Washington Stevedoring, 435 U.S. at 758.
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. Washington Stevedoring, 435 U.S. at 758.
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The Court reasoned that because the business tax was
placed on Washington state-based stevedoring companies and
non-U.S. businesses or vessels were not implicated,2 7 the tax did
not affect the Government's ability to conduct and regulate for-
eign business.22 Additionally, the tax avoided interstate friction
because it was nondiscriminatory, properly apportioned, reason-
ably related to a state activity, and only levied upon Washington
state residents. 229 Because the business and occupation tax did
not violate any of the constitutional policies laid out in Michelin,
the tax did not represent a prohibited impost or duty under the
Import-Export Clause. 230
These two decisions hold that the restrictions set forth in
the Import-Export Clause apply to specific imposts or duties and
not to general taxation.231 Under this view, the Supreme Court,
in Michelin232 and Washington Stevedoring,283 found broad nondis-
criminatory taxes to fall outside of the constitutional prohibi-
tion.234 A key element to this approach involves ,the recognition
that nondiscriminatory taxes are permissible under the Constitu-
tion because they do not discriminate against imports or exports
and cannot be manipulated so as to inhibit either one.23 5
227. Id.
228. Id. at 754.
229. Id. at 755. In order for a state business tax to withstand challenge as an in-
fringement upon Congress' commerce power, it must pass the test set forth by the
Court in Washington Stevedoring. Id. at 750. The state tax must be fairly apportioned,
nondiscriminatory against interstate commerce, applied to an activity with a substantial
connection to the state, and fairly related to the services provided by the state. Id. In
this case, the Washington State business tax on stevedoring activities was all of the
above. Id. The entire stevedoring activity of the taxed parties took place within the
State of Washington. Id. The tax was levied solely on unloading and loading that took
place in Washington and does not appear to discriminate against interstate commerce
in any way. Id. The tax is fairly related to the service and protection provided by the
state. Id. The Court, therefore, upheld the tax and concluded that it did not violate
the constitutional restrictions placed on states by the Commerce Clause. Id. The Court
then adopted this same reasoning to hold that the tax also did not create any interstate
friction. Id. at 755. The Court concluded that the tax did not implicate the third policy
of the Import-Export Clause as to create an unconstitutional impost or duty. Id.
230. Washington Stevedoring, 435 U.S. at 761.
231. Id. at 751-754; see supra notes 198-235 and accompanying text (discussing
Michelin and Washington Stevedoring decisions).
232. Michelin, 423 U.S. at 276.
233. Washington Stevedoring, 435 U.S. at 734.
234. Michelin, 423 U.S. at 293; Washington Stevedoring, 435 U.S. at 761.
235. Michelin, 423 U.S. at 287.
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C. Court of International Trade
In 1980, Congress enacted the Customs Court Act of 1980
and established the CIT2 36 to replace the U.S. Customs Court
("Customs Court")."7 Established pursuant to Article III of the
U.S. Constitution, the CIT maintains national jurisdiction."'
Generally, the CIT's jurisdiction encompasses civil suits arising
out of adverse actions taken by government agencies involved
with import transactions.239
1. History
The limited role of the original Customs Court included re-
viewing and either agreeing or disagreeing with a decision of the
U.S. Customs Service regarding classification and valuation of
goods for tariff and customs purposes. 40 In these classification
and valuation cases, the Customs Court could not issue money
judgements and until 1980 could not provide equitable relief.241
As classification and valuation became less important,242 and in-
ternational trade, antidumping,2 43 and countervailing duty2 4 is-
236. Customs Court Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-417, 94 Stat. 1727 (1980) (codified
as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 251, 1581-85, 2631-47 (1994) and scattered sections of 18
U.S.C. and 19 U.S.C. (1994)).
237. H.R. REP. No. 1235, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 20 (1980). In 1926, Congress estab-
lished the U.S. Customs Court as an Article I court. Id. at 18. In 1956, as the Customs
Court began to play a more important role in the federal judiciary system, Congress
amended the statute and proclaimed the court to be established under Article III of the
Constitution. 28 U.S.C. § 251 (1994); H.R. REP. No. 1235, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 20
(1980).
238. Edward D. Re, Litigation Before U.S. Court of International Trade, 19 U.S.C.A.
§§ 1-1300, at XIV (West. Supp. 1995). Article III, § 1 of the U.S. Constitution provides
that "[t] he judicial power of the United States shall be vested in one Supreme Court,
and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and estab-
lish." U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
239. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1581-85 (1994); Re, supra note 238, at XVI.
240. Id. at 18-19. The majority of cases before the Customs Court typically con-
cerned the classification and valuation of goods and merchandise. Id. at 18.
241. Id.
242. H.R. REP. No. 1235, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 19 (1980). Because multilateral
trade negotiations have reduced or eliminated existing tariffs between countries, classi-
fication and valuation issues have assumed a less important role in international trade
litigation. Id.
243. Gerald K. McKim, United States-Canadian Free Trade: Economic Repercussions of
the CFTA and NAFTA on the United States, Canada and the Great Lakes Region, 25 U. Tol. L.
Rev. 485, 490 n.30 (1994). Antidumping laws place fees upon imported goods that the
importing country believes are being sold below cost in order to drive out competition.
Id.
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sues became more prevalent, 245 much confusion arose surround-
ing the jurisdiction of the Customs Court.2 6 Due to this confu-
sion and the Customs Court's limited powers to grant sufficient
relief, many international trade disputes were brought before
district courts and not the Customs Court. 47 Many district
courts, however, refused to take on these international trade
cases, stating the desire to preserve the grant of exclusive juris-
diction given to the Customs Court over international trade mat-
ters.2
48
In response to these problems,249 the Customs Court Act of
1980 sought to improve judicial review of international trade
matters by revising and clarifying the statutory provisions of the
Customs Court.250 In establishing the CIT, Congress hoped to
eliminate much of the jurisdictional confusion that had plagued
international trade disputes and to ensure the uniformity of U.S.
international trade law interpretation. 251 Congress changed the
name of the Customs Court to the CIT because it believed the
new name reflected the clarified and expanded role of this court
over international trade matters.252
2. Composition
The President, with the consent of the Senate, appoints
nine judges to sit on the CIT. 253 The chief judge of the CIT
244. Id. Countervailing duty statutes establish tariffs upon an imported good that
is being unfairly subsidized by the exporter's country. Id.
245. H.R. REP. No. 1235, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 19 (1980). As tariffs became less
prevalent, countries adopted other measures such as antidumping and countervailing
duties statutes, resulting in increased litigation challenging government decisions made
under these statutes. Id. In 1979, Congress passed the Trade Agreements Act of 1979
and gave the Customs Court new responsibilities to hear cases dealing with antidump-
ing and countervailing duties issues. Pub. L. No. 96-39, 93 Stat. 144 (1979); H.R. REP.
No. 1235, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 18 (1980).
246. Id. at 19. The House of Representatives noted that "the primary statutes gov-
erning the U.S. Customs Court have not kept pace with the increasing complexities of
modem day international trade litigation." Id. at 18.
247. Id. at 19.
248. H.R. Ra. No. 1235, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 19 (1980).
249. Id. "Congress is greatly concerned that numerous individuals and firms, who
believe they possess real grievance, are expanding significant amounts of time and
money in a futile effort to obtain judicial review of the merits of their case." Id.
250. Customs Court Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-417, 94 Stat. at 1727 (1980).
251. H.R. REP. No. 1235, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 20 (1980).
252. Id.
253. Re, supra note 238, at XIV.
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assigns actions before the court to a single judge.254 If the chief
judge finds that the action involves, among other things, the
constitutionality of an act of Congress, the chief judge may as-
sign the action to a three-judge panel.255 Final decisions of the
CIT must be supported by a statement containing findings of
fact and conclusions of law, or an opinion stating the reasons
and facts upon which the opinion is based.256 Decisions of the
court are binding on all parties to the lawsuit 257 and may be ap-
pealed to the Federal Circuit.258
3. Jurisdiction
The traditional areas of the CIT's exclusive jurisdiction
under Title 28, United States Code, Section 1581259 include civil
actions pertaining to classification and valuation of imported
merchandise,26 ° charges and exactions made by the Secretary of
the Treasury, 26 1 the exclusion of merchandise from entry provi-
sions of the customs laws,262 and challenges to administrative de-
cisions under the antidumping and countervailing duty laws.265
In order to obtain jurisdiction under Section 1581, litigants must
fit into one of the categories, including those mentioned above,
listed in subsections (a) through (h) of Title 28, United States
Code, Section 1581.264
254. 28 U.S.C. §§ 253(c), 245 (1994); Re, supra note 238, at XIV.
255. 28 U.S.C. § 255 (1994); Re, supra note 238, at XIV. Assignment of a three-
judge panel is not automatic. Re, supra note 238, at XV. The underlying purpose of
§ 255 is to limit the use of three judge panels to special matters that raise important
issues requiring a more thorough judicial decision. Id.
256. 28 U.S.C. § 2645(a) (1994); Re, supra note 238, at XVII.
257. 28 U.S.C. § 2645(c) (1994); Re, supra note 238, at XVII.
258. 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(5) (1994); Re, supra note 238, at XVII.
259. 28 U.S.C. § 1581 (1994).
260. 28 U.S.C. § 1581(a), (b) (1994).
261. 28 U.S.C. § 1581(e), (h) (1994).
262. 28 U.S.C. § 1581(a) (1994).
263. 28 U.S.C. § 1581(c) (1994).
264. Gregory W. Carman, Remarks Before the Conference on International Business Prac-
tice on Practice Before the United States Court of International Trade, 2 FED. CIR. B. J. 123, 128
(1992). Judge Carman comments that litigants "must slide exactly into a glove of eight
jurisdictional fingers, known as 28 U.S.C. § 1581(a)-(h) or .... [t] hey are out of court."
Id. U.S.C. § 1581(a)-(h) provides in pertinent part that the CIT shall have exclusive
jurisdiction of any civil action commenced:
(a) . .. to contest the denial of a protest, in whole or in part, under section
515 [19 U.S.C. § 1515] of the Tariff Act of 1930.
(b) ... under section 516 [19 U.S.C. § 1516] of the Tariff Act of 1930.
(c) ... under section 516A [19 U.S.C. § 1516a] of the Tariff Act of 1930.
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The CIT also possesses a statutory grant of residual jurisdic-
tion which authorizes the court to hear any civil action arising
out of certain laws relating to international trade or the adminis-
tration and enforcement of these laws. 65 Section 1581 (i)266 acts
as a supplement to the exclusive jurisdiction authorized under
Section 1581 (a)-(h).267 Before plaintiffs can file for residual ju-
risdiction under Section 1581 (i), they must pursue all available
remedies found in subsections (a)-(h).268 Consequently, Sec-
tion 1581(i) may be invoked only when these other available
(d) ... to review-
(1) any final determination of the Secretary of Commerce under section
223 [19 U.S.C. § 2273] of the Trade Act of 1974 with respect to the eligibility
of Workers for adjustment assistance under such Act;
(2) any final determination of the Secretary of Commerce under section
251 [19 U.S.C. § 2341] of the Trade Act of 1974 with respect to eligibility of a
firm for adjustment assistance under such Act;
(3) any final determination of the Secretary of Commerce under section
271 [19 U.S.C. § 2371] of the Trade Act of 1974 with respect to the eligibility
of a community for adjustment assistance under such Act.
(e) . . . to review any final determination of the Secretary of the Treasury
under section 305(b)(1) [19 U.S.C. § 2515] of the Trade Agreements Act of
1979.
(f) ... involving an application for an order directing the administering au-
thority or the International Trade Commission to make confidential informa-
tion available under section 777(c) (2) [19 U.S.C. § 1677f] of the Tariff Act of
1930.
(g) ... to review-
(1) any decision of the Secretary of the Treasury to deny a customs bro-
ker's license under section 641(b)(2) or (3) [19 U.S.C. § 1641(b), (c)] of the
Tariff Act of 1930, or to deny a customs broker's permit under section
641(c)(1) of such Act, or to revoke a license or permit under section
641(b) (5) or (c) (2) of such Act;
(2) any decision of the Secretary of the Treasury to revoke or suspend a
custom broker's license or permit, or impose a monetary penalty in lieu
thereof, under section 641(d) (2) (B) of the Tariff Act of 1930; and
(3) any decision or order of the Customs Service to deny, suspend, or
revoke accreditation of a private laboratory under section 499(b) [19 U.S.C.
§ 1499] of the Tariff Act of 1930. (h) ... to review, prior to the importation of
the goods involved, a ruling issued by the Secretary of the Treasury, or a re-
fusal to issue or change such a ruling, relating to classification, valuation, rate
of duty, marking, restricted merchandise, entry requirements, drawbacks, ves-
sel repairs, or similar matters, but only if the party commencing the civil ac-
tion demonstrates to the court that he would be irreparably harmed unless
given an opportundy to obtain judicial review prior to such importation.
28 U.S.C. § 1581(a)-(h) (1994).
265. 28 U.S.C. § 1581(i) (1994).
266. Id.
267. Re, supra note 238, at XXXIX.
268. Id. at XL; Carman, supra note 264, at 128-29.
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means for jurisdiction are manifestly inadequate,269 or it is nec-
essary to eliminate unjustified delays resulting from pursuit of
these other remedies.27
0
The CIT possesses all the legal and equitable powers of a
U.S. district court.2 71 Section 2643 of Title 28 of the United
States Code spells out the remedies available through the CIT.27 2
These remedies include money judgements for or against the
United States, retrials, rehearings or remands for further pro-
ceedings, and any other appropriate remedy the CIT deems nec-
essary.27 3
D. NAFTA & U.S. Trade Relationship with Canada
The United States and Canada form the World's largest two-
way trade partnership. 74 In 1995, the two countries accounted
for US$242 billion in trade. 275 They represent each other's larg-
est recipient of exports and largest beneficiary of imports.2 7 6 De-
spite the economic importance of this trade relationship, the
United States and Canada historically had adopted policies of
protectionism rather than of cooperation.277
1. U.S.-Canada Trade Before the Canada-United States Free-
Trade Agreement & NAFTA
In 1854, British North American Governor General Lord El-
gin and U.S. Secretary of State William Marcy signed an agree-
ment2 78 ("Elgin-Marcy Agreement") intended to generate lim-
269. Re, supra note 238, at XL; Miller & Co. v. United States, 824 F.2d 961, 963
(Fed. Cir. 1987), cert denied, 484 U.S. 1041 (1988). An example of a manifestly inade-
quate means ofjurisdiction occurs when a plaintiff is required to protest a decision or
action by Customs over which Customs has no authority. Lynn S. Baker & Michael E.
Roll, Securing Judicial Review in the United States Court of International Trade: Has Conoco,
Inc. v. United States Broadened the Jurisdictional Boundaries?, 18 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 726,
734 (1995).
270. Miller, 824 F.2d at 963; Re, supra note 238, at XL.
271. 28 U.S.C. § 1585 (1994).
272. 28 U.S.C. § 2643 (1994).
273. 28 U.S.C. § 2643 (1994); Re, supra note 238, at XVIII.
274. McKim, supra note 243, at 485.
275. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, INTERNATIONAL TRADE ADMINISTRATION, OF-
FICE OF TRADE AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, U.S. FOREIGN TRADE HIGHLIGHTS 1994, at 18, 22
(1995) [hereinafter TRADE HIGHLIGHTS].
276. Id. at 11, 18, 22.
277. McKim, supra note 243, at 485-86.
278. 1 U.S.-CANADA FREE TRADE AGREEMENT: THE COMPLETE RESOURCE GUIDE 6
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ited free trade between the United States and Canada.2 79 The
Elgin-Marcy Agreement granted Canadian and U.S. fishermen
access to the other country's Atlantic coastal waters.28° The El-
gin-Marcy Agreement also reduced tariffs on commodities such
as grain, meat, lumber, and coal.28' Although the Agreement
was successful, 82 it was dissolved a few years later by the United
States because of economic and political dissension.283
Protectionism 284 and failed attempts at free trade285 charac-
terized the next century of U.S.-Canada trade. 86 In one in-
stance, Canada adopted the National Policy of 1879.287 The Na-
tional Policy of 1879 aimed to protect Canadian manufacturing
by raising tariffs and to pressure the United States to enter into a
new trade agreement.288 Similarly, the United States, believing
that its trading partners were using unfair trade practices, uti-
lized U.S. trade law remedies such as antidumping laws289 and
(Bureau of National Affairs Special Report 1988) [hereinafter FTA RESOURCE GUIDE];
McKim, supra note 243, at 487-88.
279. McKim, supra note 243, at 488.
280. FTA RESOURCE GUIDE, supra note 278, at 6.
281. Id.
282. Id. Overall trade between the United States and Canada increased to ap-
proximately US$73 million by 1866, but most of the growth was on Canada's side. Id.
Canada's exports to the United States increased from US$9 million in 1854 to US$49
million in 1866. Id.
283. Id. Due to the lack of economic benefit and Canada's support for the South
in the Civil War, the United States pulled out of the Elgin-Marcy Agreement in 1866.
Id.
284. EDWARD JOHN RAY, U.S. PROTECrIONISM AND THE WORLD DEBT CRISIS 22-23
(1989). Protectionism is the process of protecting a country's import-sensitive indus-
tries by using tariffs to restrict the number of imports. Id. The term refers to a range of
import restrictions, other than tariffs and quotas, used to protect a country from unfair.-
ness in international trade. Philip H. Trezise, U.S.-Canadian Free Trade: An Idea Whose
Time Has Come?, in PERSPEcrivEs ON A U.S.-CANADIAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT 1, 2 (Rob-
ert M. Stern et al. eds., 1987).
285. FTA RESOURCE GUIDE, supra note 278, at 7. In 1911, the United States and
Canada came close to signing a new trade agreement. Id. President William Howard
Taft and Prime Minister Wilfrid Laurier signed an agreement on January 26, 1911, to
lower tariffs and allow for reciprocal free entry of certain goods. Id. Canadian farmers
and businessmen, fueled by anti-American sentiment and the fear of adverse economic
results, opposed the agreement. Id. On September 11, 1911, the Conservative part)
candidate defeated both Laurier and the chance of completing the agreement. Id.
286. McKim, supra note 243, at 490.
287. Id. at 488.
288. Id.
289. McKim, supra note 243, at 490 n.30. Antidumping laws place fees upon im-
ported goods that the importing country believes are being sold below cost in order to
drive out competition. Id.
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countervailing duty laws290 to protect U.S. industry.291 Addition-
ally, in 1930 the U.S. Congress passed the Tariff Act of 1930292
("Hawley-Smoot Tariff") and created some of the highest tariffs
in the history of the United States. 29 3 The Hawley-Smoot Tariff
placed duties of fifty-three percent 294 on imports to the United
States to protect U.S. industry and labor. 95
In 1965, the United States and Canada took the first step
toward a broad free trade agreement2 96 by adopting the Automo-
tive Products Trade Act of 1965 ("Automotive Trade Act").297
The Automotive Trade Act granted Canada free access by abol-
ishing duties on Canadian autos, trucks, buses, parts, and acces-
sories entering the United States.298 On the other hand, this
agreement contained restrictions which required the United
States to meet certain standards before it received duty-free en-
try to Canada.29 Canada undertook the next step when it issued
the Trade Policy Review of 198330 and reversed its traditional
anti-free trade philosophy. 3 1 The Trade Policy Review of 1983
reported that Canada's future prosperity depended on gaining
access to the U.S. marketplace. 0 2 Then, in 1984, Conservative
Brian Mulroney took over as Prime Minister of Canada,0 3 advo-
cating a plan to create a laissez-faire economic environment in
Canada to encourage investment and expansion of the Canadian
economy.3 0 4 A key component of Mulroney's plan included
290. Id. Countervailing duty laws establish tariffs upon an imported good that is
being unfairly subsidized by the exporter's country. Id.
291. Trezise, supra note 284, at 7.
292. Pub. L. No. 361, 46 Stat. 590 (1930) [hereinafter Hawley-Smoot Tariff].
293. Lowell D. Hill, Effects of Regulation on Efficiency of Grain Marketing, 17 CASE W.
RES. J. INT'L L. 389, 398 (1985).
294. Thomas D. Grant, Foreign Takeovers of United States Airlines: Free Trade Process,
Problems, and Progress, 31 HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 63, 139 (1994).
295. Hawley-Smoot Tariff, Pub. L. No. 361, 46 Stat. at 590 (1930).
296. FTA RESOURCE GUIDE, supra note 278, at 10.
297. Pub. L. No. 89-283, 79 Stat. 1016 (1965) (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C.
§§ 2001-33 (1994)).
298. FTA RESOURCE GUIDE, supra note 278, at 7.
299. Id.
300. Sperry Lea, A Historical Perspective, in PERSPEcTIVES ON A U.S.-CANADIAN FREE
TRADE AGREEMENT 11, 26-27 (Robert M. Stern et al. eds., 1987).
301. Id.
302. Id.
303. McKim, supra note 243, at 491.
304. Id.
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gaining free access to the U.S. marketplace. 0 5
2. The Canada-United States Free-Trade Agreement
On January 1, 1988 President Ronald Reagan and Prime
Minister Mulroney signed the Canada-United States Free-Trade
Agreement ("CFTA"). °6 The CFTA created one of the largest
free trade areas in the world, affecting approximately US$125
billion in trade at the time.A7 The CFTA generally aimed to
eliminate barriers of trade in goods and services,3 °8 facilitate free
trade between the United States and Canada,0 9 encourage in-
vestment in the two countries, 31 0 establish effective dispute reso-
lutions,311 and lay a foundation for future free trade agree-
ments31 2
Chapter Four of the CFTA establishes border measures
aimed at eliminating tariffs and other trade restrictions. 313 Arti-
cle 401, s '4 the main component of Chapter Four, creates a
schedule of tariff reduction between the United States and Can-
ada.3 15 The CFTA will effectively eliminate all bilateral tariffs be-
tween the United States and Canada byJanuary 1, 1998.316 The
Agreement provides for three stages of tariff removal.317 Stage I
eliminated tariffs .on specific enumerated goods immediately
upon effectiveness of the agreement.3 18 Stage II eliminated tar-
iffs in five annual reductions byJanuary 1, 1993 .3 1 Finally, stage
305. Id.
306. Canada-United States: Free-Trade Agreement, Jan. 2, 1988, U.S.-Can., 27
I.L.M. 281 (1988) [hereinafter CFTA].
307. Id., 27 I.L.M. at 281.
308. Id. art. 102(a), 27 I.L.M. at 293.
309. Id. art. 102(b), 27 I.L.M. at 293.
310. Id. art. 102(c), 27 I.L.M. at 293.
311. Id. art. 102(d), 27 I.L.M. at 293.
312. Id. art. 102(e), 27 I.L.M. at 293.
313. FTA RESOURCE GUIDE, supra note 278, at 35.
314. CFTA, supra note 306, art. 401, 27 I.L.M. at 306.
315. Id. art. 401(2), 27 I.L.M. at 306.
316. FTA RESOURCE GUIDE, supra note 278, at 35.
317. Id.
318. CFI'A, supra note 306, art. 401(2) (a), 27 I.L.M. at 306. Products in Stage I
include computer equipment, motorcycles, leather goods, and whiskey. JUDITH H.
BELLO & ALAN F. HOLMER, GUIDE TO THE U.S.-C..ANADA FREE-TRADE AGREEMENT 397
(1992). These goods were believed to be able to exist in a duty-free environment with-
out any adjustment period. Id.
319. CFTA, supra note 306, art. 401(2)(b), 27 I.L.M. at 306. Stage II includes pa-
per products, subway cars, furniture, and most machinery. BELLO & HOLMER, supra
note 318, at 398.
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III eliminates tariffs in ten annual reductions to be completed by
January 1, 1998.20
Article 407321 of Chapter Four prohibits the adoption of im-
port or export restrictions, other than tariffs, such as quotas and
other quantitative restrictions.322 Article 407 seeks to prevent
parties to the Agreement from establishing trade restrictions us-
ing methods other than tariffs.32 3 Furthermore, Article 408 bans
either country from adopting or maintaining export taxes on
goods to the other party.324
3. NAFTA
On December 17, 1992, President George Bush, President
Salinas, and Prime Minister Mulroney signed NAFTA. 23 In
1988, Mexican President Carlos Salinas de Gortari initiated a
plan for long-term growth and development of Mexico into a
respected international economic entity.326 Mexico, similar to
Canada, realized that in order to develop and grow economically
it would need free access to the U.S. marketplace. 2 7 President
Clinton submitted NAFTA to Congress on November 4, 199328
and Congress approved the Act on December 8, 1993.29
320. CFTA, supra note 306, art. 401(2) (c), 27 I.L.M. at 306. Included in Stage III
are most agricultural products, textiles, steel, appliances, rail cars, and rubber. BELLO &
HOLMER, supra note 318, at 398. These goods are most susceptible to import competi-
tion problems and need a long period of adjustment before duty-free trade can begin.
Id.
321. CFTA, supra note 306, art. 407, 27 I.L.M. at 310.
322. BELLO & HOLMER, supra note 318, at 411-12 (1992). Article 407 does not
prohibit import and export restrictions that are permitted under GATT for certain con-
ditions dealing with national security, health and safety, conservation, and short supply.
CFTA, supra note 306, art. 407, 27 I.L.M. at 310.
323. BELLO & HOLMER, supra note 318, at 411-12.
324. CFTA, supra note 306, art. 408, 27 I.L.M. at 310.
325. NAFTA, supra note 28, 32 I.L.M. at 289.
326. America Builds a Trade Block, ECONOMIST, Aug. 15, 1992, at 53.
327. McKim, supra note 243, at 495; Katherine Barnhart, A Canadian Thumbs Up for
the NAFTA, Bus. MEx., Oct. 1992, at 40. Unlike the enthusiastic Mexican Government,
Canada entered the agreement mostly to protect its pre-existing trade agreement with
the United States, and not to establish a new trading parmer in Mexico. Dierdre
McMurdy & John Daly, Clearing the Final Hurdles: Trade Ministers Agonize Over the Final
Touches to a Continental Trade Pact, MACLEAN'S, Aug. 17, 1992, at 24.
328. DonaldJ. Musch, Summary of NAFTA Legislative Histoy, in 1 NORTH AMERICAN
FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS, TREATIES 4 (James R. Holbien & DonaldJ. Musch eds. 1995)
[hereinafter TRADE AGREEMENTS].
329. North American Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act, Pub. L. No.
103-182, § 101, 107 Stat. 2061 (Dec. 8, 1993) (codified at 19 U.S.C. §§ 3311 (1994)).
U.S. SHOE CORP. v. UNITED STATES
a. Free Trade of Goods under NAFTA
The contracting parties to NAFTA represent the World's
largest trade area, consisting of 360 million people and a com-
bined gross national product of approximately US$6.3 trillion.33 °
Following NAFTA, trade between the United States and Canada
continued to prosper as Canada retained its place as the premier
trading partner of the United States.331 In 1994, the United
States exported approximately US$114.3 billion worth of mer-
chandise and goods to Canada, up fourteen percent from
1993.32 Additionally, the United States received approximately
US$128.9 billion worth of Canadian goods, sixteen percent
higher than in 1993. s~s
In general terms, NAFTA creates a free trade area between
the United States, Canada, and Mexico in which tariffs and non-
tariff barriers to trade are reduced between the parties.334 The
contracting parties designed NAFTA to stimulate trade and in-
vestment in North America through a more efficient use of capi-
tal, land, labor, and technology.3 3 NAFTA is subdivided into six
principle areas corresponding to its stated objectives.33 6 NAFTA
proposes to eliminate barriers to trade between the United
States, Mexico, and Canada,3 37 promote fair competition among
the parties,33s increase investment opportunities,3 3 9 secure ade-
quate and effective intellectual property protection, 40 create ef
fective dispute resolution mechanisms, 1 and establish a frame-
work for future agreements. 42
Chapter Three of NAFTA3 43 provides the central framework
330. Alexander, supra note 29, at 48.
331. UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 1995 NATIONAL TRADE ESTIMATE RE-
PORT ON FOREIGN TRADE BARRIERS 33 (1995) [hereinafter TRADE BARRIERS REPORT].
332. Id.
333. Id.
334. Charles R. Johnston, Jr. et al., Summary of the North American Free Trade Agree-
ment, in 1 NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS, COMMENTARIES 1 (James R.
Holbien & Donald J. Musch eds., 1995) [hereinafter TRADE COMMENTARIES].
335. Alexander, supra note 29, at 48-49.
336. McKim, supra note 243, at 497-98.
337. NAFTA, supra note 28, art. 102(1)(a), 32 I.L.M. at 297.
338. Id. art. 102(1)(b), 32 I.L.M. at 297.
339. Id. art. 102(1)(c), 32 I.L.M. at 297.
340. Id. art. 102(1)(d), 32 I.L.M. at 297.
341. Id. art. 102(1)(e), 32 I.L.M. at 297.
342. Id. art. 102(1)(f), 32 I.L.M. at 297.
343. Id. Ch. 3, 32 I.L.M. at 299.
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for free trade of goods between the United States and Mexico by
eliminating tariffs and non-tariff restrictions to market access.3 4 4
Article 302141 prevents any party from increasing' or adopting
new tariffs according to the schedule set up in Annex 302.2.346
Stage I provides that upon January 1, 1994, duties will be re-
moved on certain categories of goods including computers and
automobiles.3 47 Stage II phases out tariffs over a five-year period
in annual reductions ending by January 1, 1998.348 Stage III
eliminates tariffs in ten yearly cuts, to be completed by January 1,
2003. 3 49 Finally, Stage IV tariffs will be eliminated byJanuary 1,
2008 through fifteen annual reductions.350 The CFTA tariff re-
duction plan will remain in effect until its completion in 1998.351
In addition, Article 309 imposes import and export restric-
tion upon the parties to the Agreement. 35 2 Article 309 forbids
any party to the Agreement from maintaining or adopting ex-
port restrictions on goods destined to another country within
the Agreement. 35 3 This rule is accompanied by a long list of ex-
empted industries such as timber, automotive, textiles, and en-
ergy.35 4 In addition, Article 314 prohibits the parties from
adopting or maintaining any tax on goods exported to another
country within the Agreement. 355 An exception to Article 314
permits a party to impose an export tax on goods to a particular
country, if the party imposes the same tax on goods exported to
344. Id. 32 I.L.M. at 299-349; PAUL ET AL., NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREE-
MENT, SUMMARY AND ANALYSIS 5 (1993) [hereinafter NAFTA SUMMARY];
345. NAFTA, supra note 28, art. 302, 32 I.L.M. at 300.
346. Id. art. 302(4), 32 I.L.M. at 300.
347. Id. annex 302.2(1) (a), 32 I.L.M. at 310; NAFTA SUMMARY, supra note 344, at
5.
348. NAFTA, supra note 28, annex 302.2(1)(b), 32 I.L.M. at 310.
349. Id. annex 302.2(1)(c), 32 I.L.M. at 310.
350. Id. annex 302.2(1)(d), 32 I.L.M. at 310.
351. Id.; see supra notes 314-20 and accompanying text (describing tariff reduction
under CFTA).
352. NAFTA, supra note 28, art. 309(1), 32 I.L.M. at 303.
353. Id.
354. Id. annex 301.3, 32 I.L.M. at 305; NAFTA SUMMARY, supra note 344, at 6.
355. Id. art. 314, 32 I.L.M. at 303. NAFTA Article 314 provides that:
No Party may adopt or maintain any duty, tax, or other charge on the export
of any good to the territory of another Party, unless such duty, tax or charge is
adopted or maintained on: (a) exports of any such good to the territory of all
other Parties; and (b) any such good when destined for domestic consump-
tion.
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all other countries and goods destined for domestic consump-
tion. 56 Article 314, however, permits Mexico to tax exports of
certain food items such as beans, wheat flour, corn tortillas, and
eggs.3 5
7
b. Dispute Resolution under NAFTA
Chapter Twenty of NAFTA358 establishes two institutions to
administer the Agreement and settle its disputes. 359  Cabinet-
level trade representatives from each of the parties will comprise
the Free Trade Commission ("Commission") .160 The Commis-
sion will supervise the implementation and further elaboration
of the Agreement as well as resolve disputes that may arise re-
garding interpretation of the Agreement. 61 The Secretariat
shall be established to assist the Commission and any other com-
mittees the Commission establishes. 62  The Secretariat includes
national sections that are established, staffed, and operated by
the individual parties.363
NAFTA creates a three-step process for dispute resolution
arising under the Agreement.3 64 One party requests consulta-
tions from another in order to attempt to arrive at a mutually
beneficial settlement to the dispute. 65 If the consulting parties
fail to arrive at a resolution within thirty to forty days,3 66 either of
the parties may request a meeting of the Commission. 6 7 The
Commission convenes within ten days3 68 of the request and may
utilize technical advisors, expert groups, and dispute resolution
mechanisms such as mediation to reach a prompt resolution. 69
If the Commission does not resolve the matter within thirty days,
either party may request the establishment of an arbitral
356. Id. art. 314(a),(b), 32 I.L.M. at 303.
357. Id. annex 314, 32 I.L.M. at 319.
358. NAFTA SUMMARY, supra note 344, at 100.
359. Id.
360. Id.
361. NAFTA, supra note 28, art. 2001(2), 32 I.L.M. at 693.
362. Id. art. 2001 (3) (a), (b), 32 I.L.M. at 693.
363. NAFTA SUMMARY, supra note 344, at 100.
364. Id. at 101.
365. NAFrA, supra note 28, art. 2006(1),(5), 32 I.L.M. at 694.
366. Id. art. 2007(1), 32 I.L.M. at 695. For perishable agricultural goods, the time
frame is reduced to fifteen days. Id. art. 2007(1)(c), 32 I.L.M. at 695.
367. Id. art. 2007(1), 32 I.L.M. at 695.
368. Id. art. 2007(4), 32 I.L.M. at 695.
369. Id. art. 2007(5), 32 I.L.M. at 695.
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panel. 37 0 Five members, chosen by the disputing parties, consti-
tute the arbital panel who evaluate the issue and provide an ini-
tial report within ninety days and a final report thirty days
later.3 7
1
The parties will agree to accept and be bound to the deter-
minations of the Commission or panel.3 72 The resolution usu-
ally will involve an order to remove or not to execute the offend-
ing trade measure but may require compensation for dam-
ages.3 73  If a party does not comply with or accept this
determination, the opposing party may suspend the benefits
given to the other party under the Agreement and execute retal-
iatory trade measures of its own. s7
D. Harbor Maintenance Tax and Trust Fund
In 1986, Congress passed the Water Resources Development
Act3 75 to improve and repair the United States' navigable water
system.376 As part of this Act, Congress established the HMT.377
Congress enacted the HMT to compel commercial shippers, the
major beneficiaries of U.S. port and harbor repair and mainte-
nance, to pay for such repair and maintenance. 78
370. Id. art. 2008(1), 32 I.L.M. at 695.
371. McKim, supra note 243, at 516.
372. Id.
373. NAFTA SuMmARY, supra note 344, at 102.
374. McKim, supra note 243, at 516
375. Water Resources Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-662, 100 Stat. 4082 (1986).
376. Id. The Act provided for the conservation and development of water and
related resources and the improvement and rehabilitation of the nation's water re-
sources infrastructure. Id. This infrastructure is made up of the nation's inland water-
way system in connection with coastal harbors and ports. S. REP. No. 126, 99th Cong.,
1st Sess. 7 (1985) (discussing effect of tax on commercial inland waterways along with
coastal harbors and ports). The inland waterway system of the United States includes
25,000 miles of waterways, connected by 160 dams and 240 locks. Id. at 7. Additionally,
there are approximately 300 ports, including harbors, in the United States that are
subject to Harbor Maintenance fees. 19 C.F.R. § 24.24 (b)(1).
377. Harbor Maintenance Revenue Act of 1986, 26 U.S.C. §§ 4461-62 (1994).
378. See H.R. REP. No. 228, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1985). Historically, general
government revenues were used to finance the full costs of developing, operating, and
maintaining U.S. harbors and ports. S. REP. No. 126, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1985);
H.R. REP. No. 228, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1985). The Senate and the House both
believed that this change in funding was needed in order to successfully meet the grow-
ing needs of the U.S. water transportation system and allow the United States to grow
and develop economically. S. RP. No 126, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1985); H.R. REP.
No. 228, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1985).
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1. Operation of the HMT
Congress structured the HMT as an ad valorem tax... im-
posed upon any port use,38 ° defined as the loading and unload-
ing of commercial cargo381 from a commercial vessel 382 at a
port. 8 3 As originally enacted, the tax was assessed at 0.04% of
the value of the cargo involved. 84 In 1990, Congress increased
the HMT 385 to 0.125% of the value of the commercial cargo be-
ing exported. 86 This ad valorem amount does not account for
the size of the vessel, the manner and extent of its port use, or
the conditions of the port itself.3 87 Parties responsible for the
tax include the importer of commercial cargo into the United
States, the exporter of cargo out of the United States, or the
shipper in any other case. 88
Exporters are liable for the HMT at the time they load their
cargo for exportation out of the United States38 9 and they pay
the tax on a quarterly basis.390 The statute imposes the tax upon
the value of commercial cargo and not the amount of port.
use. 39 1 Bunker fuel and other items of equipment necessary for
379. RUTH F. STu%4, A MANUAL OF CUSTOMS LAW 39 (1974). Ad valorem is a
method of taxing in which the amount of the tax is determined by a percentage of the
value of the taxed cargo. Id.
380. 26 U.S.C. § 4461 (a) (1994). The term "any port use" does not include ever)'
port within the United States and the statute designates those ports which are not sub-
ject to this tax. 26 U.S.C. § 4462(2)(B) (1994). This category of excluded ports in-
cludes those that have not utilized federal funds since 1977 and those that, prior to
1985, have been deauthorized to receive federal funds. 26 U.S.C § 4462(2) (B) (1994).
381. 26 U.S.C. § 4462(a)(3) (1994). Commercial cargo is defined for use in this
statute as any cargo transported on a commercial vessel, including passengers trans-
ported for compensation or hire. 26 U.S.C. § 4462(a) (3) (A) (1994).
382. 26 U.S.C. § 4462(a)(4) (1994). Commercial vessel is defined for the pur-.
poses of this statute as any vessel used in transporting cargo by water for compensation
or hire or in the business of the owner, lessee, or operator of the vessel. 26 U.S.C.
§ 4462(a) (4) (A) (i), (ii) (1994).
383. 26 U.S.C. § 4462(a)(1)(A), (B) (1994).
384. Water Resources Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-662, 100 Stat. at 4266 (1986).
385. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, § 11214,
104 Stat. 1388, 1436 (Nov. 5 1990) (codified at 26 U.S.C. § 4461 (1994)).
386. 26 U.S.C. § 4461(b) (1994).
387. U.S. Shoe, 907 F. Supp. at 411.
388. 26 U.S.C. § 4461(c)(1)(A)-(C) (1994).
389. 26 U.S.C. § 4461(2) (A) (1994). For cases involving importers or other ship-
pers, the tax is imposed at the time of unloading. 26 U.S.C. § 4461(2)(B) (1994).
390. 19 C.F.R. § 24.24(e) (2) (ii) (1995).
391. 26 U.S.C. § 4461(b) (1994); Brief of Amici Curiae Aris-Isotoner et al. at 24-5,
U.S. Shoe, 907 F. Supp. 408 (No. 94-11-00668) [hereinafter Aris-Isotoner Brief].
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the operation of the vessel are excluded.39 2 The statute also ex-
empts many other items of cargo from tax liability, such as fish
or other aquatic animal life caught during the voyage of a fish-
ing vessel,3 93 passengers on ferry boats,394 and bonded commer-
cial cargo 395 entering the United States for transportation and
direct exportation to a non-U.S. port.3 9 6  The tax also exempts
shipments of cargo between the continental United States and
Alaska, Hawaii, or any other non-continental territory of the
United States, such as Puerto Rico. 97
In conjunction with the HMT, Congress established the
Trust Fund 398 to implement the purposes of the tax.399 The U.S.
Customs Service collects the money from the tax and transfers400
it to the Trust Fund to be allocated according to the terms of the
statute.4 ' Congress authorizes the Trust Fund to cover up to
392. 26 U.S.C. § 4462 (a) (3) (B) (i) (1994); Aris-Isotoner Brief, at 24-5, U.S. Shoe,
907 F. Supp. 408 (No. 94-11-00668).
393. 26 U.S.C. § 4462(a)(3)(B)(ii) (1994). Senator Mitchell first suggested the
exemption to protect the small fisherman of Maine. ADDITIONAL COMMENTS BY SENA-
TOR MITCHELL, S. REP. No. 126, 99th Cong., lst Sess. 133 (1985). The exemption fur-
ther protected the emerging national fishing industry. ADDITIONAL COMMENTS BY SENA-
TOR LAUTENBERG, S. REP. No. 126, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 135 (1985). Lautenberg real-
ized that "[i]t would be unwise to burden an emerging industry with additional costs in
contravention of efforts to make that industry competitive with foreign fishing fleets."
S. REP. No. 126, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 135 (1985).
394. 26 U.S.C. § 4462(a) (4) (B) (1994). The statute does not consider passengers
on ferry boats engaged in transportation within the United States to be commercial
cargo. 26 U.S.C. § 4462(a)(4)(B)(1) (1994).
395. RUTH F. STURM, 2 CUSTOMS LAW AND ADMINISTRATION, § 3.3, at 51. (3d ed.
1994). Bonds to Customs: are issued to persons, firms or corporations to ensure that
they pay the necessary amounts due to the U.S. Government from their compliance
with the Customs Laws. Id. The bond is filed with the Customs Service in order to
guarantee that proper entry summaries are filed, tax and duty payments will be made,
and merchandise will be redelivered if found not to comply with the applicable laws
and regulations. Id. Bonded commercial cargo is cargo that has a properly filed bond
attached to it. Id.
396. 26 U.S.C. § 4462(d) (1) (1994). In addition, the statute exempts the U.S. Gov-
ernment, nonprofit organizations and cooperatives and any intraport use from tax lia-
bility. 26 U.S.C. § 4462(e), (g)(2), (h) (1994). These exemptions fit within the plan of
Congress to have commercial shippers pay for the benefit of using these harbors and
ports. H.R. REP. 228, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1985).
397. 26 U.S.C. § 4462(b)(1)(A) (1994).
398. Water Resources Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-662, § 1403, 100 Stat. at 4269; see
supra note 22 (describing Trust Fund and its basic functions).
399. 26 U.S.C. § 9505(a) (1994).
400. 26 U.S.C. § 9505(b) (1994).
401. 26 U.S.C. § 9505(c) (1994). U.S.C. § 9505 authorizes the allocation of money
out of the Trust Fund to make expenditures to pay 100% of eligible operations and
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one hundred percent of the funds needed for the operation and
maintenance of U.S. harbors and ports.4"2 The U.S. Army Corps
of Engineers,40 3 responsible for the maintenance duties relating
to the water infrastructure of the United States,40 4 receives the
largest proportion of Trust Fund monies.40 5
2. The Impact of the HMT
U.S. exporters and port management 40 6 criticize the HMT
maintenance of the St. Lawrence Seaway handled by the St. Lawrence Seaway Develop-
ment Corporation ("SLSDC"). 26 U.S.C. § 9505(c)(1) (1994); 33 U.S.C. § 2238(a)(1)
(1994). U.S.C. § 9505 also authorizes payment of sums necessary to cover cost of opera-
tions and maintenance provided to commercial navigation of all harbors and inland
harbors within the United States. 26 U.S.C. § 9505(c)(1) (1994). In addition, the Trust
Fund is authorized to pay for all expenses, up to US$5,000,000 within one fiscal year,
incurred by the Treasury Department, Army Corps of Engineers, and Department of
Commerce while administrating the HMT. 26 U.S.C. § 9505(c)(3) (1994).
402. Water Resources Development Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-640, § 316, 104
Stat. 4604, 4641 (Nov. 28, 1990) (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. § 2322). Prior to
the 1990 amendment, the Harbor Maintenance Trust Fund was responsible for up to
40% of these repair and maintenance costs. Water Resources Development Act of
1986, Pub. L. No. 99-662, § 210, 100 Stat. at 4106.
403. OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL REGISTER, UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT MANUAL 209
(1995/96) [hereinafter GOVERNMENT MANUAL]. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
manages and executes the Civil Works programs of the Department of the Army, in-
cluding research and development, and operation and maintenance related to rivers,
harbors, and waterways in the United States. Id.
404. S. REP. No. 126, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 7-8 (1985). The Army Corps of Engi-
neers is responsible for harbor improvement and development because of the high
costs and the engineering expertise that harbor maintenance entails. Id.
405. OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT,
BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 1996-APPENDIx, at 376 (1996)
[hereinafter BUDGET APPENDIX]. According to the Army Civil Works Division, in 1996,
appropriations from the Trust Fund were given out as follows:
SLSDC 1995, US$10,410,000
1996, US$10,412,000
Army Corps of Engineers 1995, US$462,000,000
1996, US$500,000,000
Department of the Treasury 1996, US$3,000,000
Nat. Oceanic & Atmospheric Assoc. (proposed) 1996, US$45,000,000
Id.
406. Anne Thompson, Firms Sue To Sink Harbor-Upkeep Tax, SEATrLE TIMES, May 4,
1995, at D3. Port Management is represented by the American Association of Port Au-
thorities ("AAPA") who lobby on their behalf before Congress. Id. The AAPA repre-
sents U.S. public port agencies who by mandate of law facilitate waterborne commerce
and generate local and regional economic growth. Stromberg Statement, supra note 16, at
143. These port agencies are private port management firms with an interest in port
development, water transportation, and accessorial services. 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF As-
SOCIATIONS 613 (Carolyn A. Fisher & Carol A. Schwartz eds., 30th ed. 1996).
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for placing U.S. ports at a competitive disadvantage with respect
to Canadian ports for U.S. export business.40 7 Furthermore,
they claim that many Canadian ports encourage U.S. exporters
to take advantage of tax free Canadian ports and avoid the tax
liabilities imposed by the HMT. 40 8 Exporters who ship through
U.S. ports face high tax liabilities 09 on their cargo that they
would not incur at Canadian ports.410 A ship coming to a U.S.
port faces HMT charges of approximately US$75,000 while the
same ship in Canada would only face charges between US$432
and US$8640.411  This has led to considerable diversion 412 of
cargo to Canada and away from U.S. ports.413 In 1988, the De-
partment of Transportation's Maritime Administration reported
407. The Water Resources Development Act of 1994 and Issues Related to the Reauthoriza-
tion of the Civil Works Program of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers: Hearings Before the Subcom-
mittee on Water Resources and Environment of the House Committee on Public Works and Trans-
portation, 103rd Cong., 2d Sess., 478 (July 26, 1994) [hereinafter Stromberg Statement]
(prepared statement of Erik Stromberg, President, American Association of Port Au-
thorities). See Anne D. Aylward, Harbor Tax Costly to US. Ports, CONTAINER NEWS, Apr.
1992, at 86 ("Many companies are experienceing moderate to sharp increases in their
per-container box cost, leading some of them to route their cargo through Canadian
ports rather than U.S. container ports."); Robertshaw, supra note 16, at 1 (discussing
U.S. diversion of cargo to Montreal, Canada to avoid the added costs created by HMT).
Stromberg, in his testimony before Congress, warned that:
[U.S.] ports, particularly on the northern tier, are at a significant competitive
disadvantage in attracting cargo because shippers can avoid the [Harbor Main-
tenance] [T]ax by sending cargo through non-U.S. ports .... We must find a
way to protect U.S. ports against diversion of cargo as the result of the Harbor
Maintenance Tax ....
Stromberg Statement 94, supra, at 485.
408. Aylward, supra note 407, at 86. According to the author, "[w]e have seen
examples of direct marketing by Canadian carriers to take advantage of the tax." Id.
Robertshaw adds that "[sihipping experts say Montreal has been especially aggressive in
touting how companies can avoid U.S. taxes and fees." Robertshaw, supra note 16, at 1.
409. Aylward Statement, supra note 16, at 73. The HMT levy on an average cargo
container ship loading or unloading at a U.S. port is approximately US$75,000. Id. at
75. Currently, Canada has no national harbor charge except that some local ports do
impose a charge on an individual basis. Valenti Statement, supra note 16, at 157.
410. Valenti Statement, supra note 16, at 158.
411. Id.
412. Id.; see supra note 16 (illustrating problem of cargo diversion to Canada).
413. Aylward, supra note 407, at 86. The story of one shipper exemplifies the di-
lemma faced by the shippers and the ports. Thompson, supra note 406. Steve Farris,
traffic manager for Ionics, a manufacturer of water-purification systems, ships his equip-
ment 309 miles to Montreal, even though Boston Harbor is just six miles away, in order
to save US$160,000 in potential taxes to his company. Id. Diversion of cargo to Canada
has historically been a problem facing the U.S. trade business. Bruce Vail, Canada Cargo
Diversion Cuts Both Ways, AM. SHIPPER, Oct. 1994, at 78. In the 1970's and early 1980's,
there was a lot of diversion to Canada as a result of labor unrest in U.S. East Coast ports.
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that approximately 4.8 million tons of cargo moved through Ca-
nadian ports at the expense of the United States.414 The ports of
Seattle, Tacoma, and Boston415 have lost the most export vol-
ume, while the Canadian ports of Vancouver and Montreal have
received the greatest increase in business.41 6
The HMT places the United States at a competitive disad-
vantage with respect to U.S. exports in the world market. 417 The
decline in U.S. competitiveness results from increased U.S. ex-
port prices, reduced prices paid to U.S. producers, and in-
creased costs of using U.S. ports caused by the HMT.4 1  Freight-
cost is an integral part of a U.S. product's price, and this in-
creased cost adversely affects closely competitive goods such as
grain and coal, in which tiny differences in cost can mean lost
business.4" In the precious metal industry, increased cost due
to the HMT and intense price competition have lead to lost busi-
nets for many companies who cannot get companies to purchase
at the increased price. 42 ° The HMT also affects U.S. agricultural
exports, for which a small difference in price can cause a U.S.
exporter to lose business to a competitor nation.42 1 In addition,
Id. The diversion has not declined with the passing of these labor troubles and has, in
fact, risen, which can be directly attributed to the HMT. Id.
414. Aylward Statement, supra note 16, at 75.
415. Introduction of a Bill to Roll Back the Harbor Maintenance Tax, 141 Cong. Rec.
E519 (Mar. 6, 1995) [hereinafter McDermott Bill] (statement by Rep. Jim McDermott);
see supra note 16 (discussing affects of HMT on Seattle, Tacoma, and Boston harbors).
416. Leigh Stoner, Harbor Tax Rollback Proposed in Bill Introduced in House, INSIDE
DOT & TRANSP. WEEK, Mar. 24, 1995, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, CURNWS File.
As stated by Stoner, more than 50% of the trans-Atlantic traffic passing through Mon-
treal is either coming from or bound to the United States. Id. Montreal is also at an
advantage because of good railroad connections into and out of the United States.
Robertshaw, supra note 16, at 1.
417. Aylward Statement, supra note 16, at 77; see Daniel B. Moskowitz, Trade Burdens,
INT'L Bus., May 1993, at 72 (noting that this trend is especially troublesome because it
comes at time when exports are beginning to play more important role in U.S. com-
merce).
418. Aylward Statement, supra note 16, at 77.
419. Id. Trade taxes have resulted in cost increases amounting to 30 cents for a
ton of wheat and 47 cents for a ton of coal. Id.
420. Cumulative Impact of Taxes and Various Fees Levied on the Maritime Industry: Hear-
ings Before the Subcommittee on Oversights and Investigations, House Merchant Marine and
Fisheries Committee, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 142 (May 23, 1991) [hereinafter Christiano State-
ment) (prepared statement of John J. Christiano, Degussa Corporation).
421. McCoy Statement, supra note 16, at 153-55; Paul Cohan, Maritime Taxes Face
Opposition, CONTAINER NEWS, July 1991, at 6. Steven McCoy, President of the North
American Export Grain Association, estimates that taxes cost U.S. agricultural exporters
an additional US$45 million a year; in one year, the tax on a US$5 million corn ship-
1996] 1805
1806 FORDHAMINTERNATIONALLAWJOURNAL [Vol. 19:1764
the economies of export-dependent states such as Washington
particularly suffer as a result of the competitive handicap the
HMT creates.42 Washington State, for example, could lose ex-
port sales and export-related jobs as increased costs give Cana-
dian and Australian timber and agriculture companies a compet-
itive advantage over Washington for overseas sales.42
The Trust Fund is also encountering problems.424 Presently
there exists a surplus of approximately US$650 million in the
fund.4 25  The Government placed the surplus "on budget,"42 6
helping to foster the belief held by U.S. exporters that the HMT
ment increased from US$2000 to US$6500. McCoy Statement, supra note 16, at 153.
Sharon Mock, Grain Transportation Coordinator for The Andersons Management
Corp., explains that "[tihe grain industry is extremely price sensitive. A price differen-
tial as slight as one cent a bushel can swing business away from Great Lakes ports to
other shipping points. User fees add one more cost to Great Lakes shipping - threat-
ening our price competitiveness in world markets." Mock Letter, supra note 16, at 132.
422. David Schaeffer, Port Officials Fighting Harbor-Tax Increase, SEATrLE TIMEs,
Sept. 15, 1990, atA12. In a letter to the Congress budget negotiators, Washington State
delegates complained that "[a]s the most trade-dependent state in the United States,
Washington would be hurt the most by depressed exports and lower overall trade
volumes. Washington State exports of wheat, apples, aircraft and other goods would
become less competitive in the international marketplace." Id.
423. Cumulative Impact of Taxes and Various Fees Levied on the Maritime Industy: Hear-
ings Before the Subcommittee on Oversights and Investigations, House Merchant Marine and
Fisheries Committee, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 166-67 (May 23, 1991) [hereinafter Ports State-
ment] (Statement by Port of Seattle and Port of Tacoma).
424. McDermott Bill, supra note 415, at E519.
425. Id. The surplus in the trust fund has continued to grow from US$120.6 mil-
lion for the fiscal year ("FY") 1992 to US$302.3 million for FY 1993 and up to US$451.4
million at the end of FY 1994. Id. In FY 1994, the Trust Fund collected US$646.2
million or 130% of the US$497.1 million distributed for harbor maintenance costs. Id.
The surplus is expected to grow to US$644.3 million by the end of FY 1995 and reach
US$802.9 million by the end of FY 1996. Id. This surplus is also in danger of violating
Articles II and VIII of The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade, opened for signature Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A3, 55 U.N.T.S. 187
(1950) [hereinafter GATT]; McDermott Bill, supra note 415. A surplus in the Trust Fund
would violate Article II of GATT because it is evidence that the HMT is a fee beyond
compensation for services rendered. GATT, art. II 2(c), 55 U.N.T.S. at 202. Article II
2(c) provides, in pertinent part, that "nothing shall prevent any contracting party from
imposing at any time on the importation of any product: fees or other charges com-
mensurate with the cost of services rendered." Id. Accordingly, if the Trust Fund runs
at a surplus, it is raising more money than is needed for its intended purpose and the
HMT is, therefore, not "commensurate with the cost of the services rendered." McDer-
mott Bill, supra note 415, at E519. Additionally, the surplus could violate Article VIII if
Congress took funds out of the surplus in order to offset the budget deficit. GATT, art.
VIII, 55 U.N.T.S. at 218-19. Article VIII provides, in pertinent part, that:
All fees and charges of whatever character imposed by contracting parties on
or in connection with importation or exportation shall be limited in amount
to the approximate cost of services rendered and shall not represent an indi-
1996] U.S. SHOE CORP. v. UNITED STATES 1807
does not represent a user fee but rather a revenue raising tax.427
II. U.S. SHOE V. UNITED STATES
Because the HMT unfairly burdens U.S. exporters, the
American Association of Exporters & Importers4 28 filed suit in
federal district court, claiming the HMT violated the Export
Clause of the U.S. Constitution.42 9 Believing that the CIT and
not the district court had properjurisdiction, approximately one
hundred4 3 ° U.S. exporters filed similar actions in the CIT chal-
lenging the constitutionality of the HMT.431 The CIT stayed all
rect protection of domestic products or a taxation of imports or exports for
fiscal purpose.
Id. The HMT would, therefore, violate GATT if Congress chose to take money from the
Trust Fund in order to help pay for other domestic programs such as reducing the
federal budget deficit. Id.
426. OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT,
BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 1996-ANAVrICAL PERSPEC-
TIrs 325 (1996) [hereinafter BUDGET PERSPECTIVES]. "On budget" reflects the transac-
tions of all government entities that are included in budget calculations except those
that are excluded by law such as Social Security Trust Funds and the Postal Service
Fund. Id. The budget specifically notes that "[a]ny net cash inflow from the public to
the trust funds decreases the Treasury's need to borrow from the public in order to
finance the Federal funds deficit." Id. at 251. In 1994, income from trust.funds, the
Trust Fund included, exceeded expenditures by nearly US$95 billion. Id. at 252. This
surplus helps to offset the Government's need to borrow from the public to fully fi-
nance the US$298 billion federal debt. Id.
427. Aris-Isotoner Brief, at 33-34, U.S. Shoe, 408 F. Supp. 408 (No. 94-11-00668)
(arguing that excess of funds demonstrates revenue raising purpose rather than regula-
tory purpose). According to the General Accounting Office, "as the unified budget is
presendy structured, the surpluses in the trust funds are merged with the rest of the
budget, effectively masking the magnitude of those surpluses and the size of the deficit
in the rest of the government." GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, MANAGING THE COST OF
THE GOVERNMENT 9 (Oct. 1989).
428. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ASSOCIATIONS, supra note 406, at 262. Founded in 1921, the
American Association of Exporters and Importers ("AAEI") seeks to maintain fair world
trade, provides legal advice to its members regarding laws and regulations, and testifies
for exporters and importers before government and other official bodies. Id. The
AAEI consists of those engaged directly or indirectly with export and import trade. Id.
429. American Ass'n of Exporters & Importers v. Bentsen, No. L94-1839 (D. Md.
filed July 1, 1994). The Government moved to dismiss this case arguing that the CIT,
not the district court, had proper jurisdiction. Government's Motion to Dismiss, filed
Sept. 20, 1994, American Ass'n of Exporters & Importers v. Bentson, No. L94-1839, (D.
Md. July 1, 1994).
430. Telephone Interview with Michael E. Roll, Attorney at Law, Katten Muchin &
Zavis, Chicago, 11. (Feb. 5, 1996). The number of lawsuits pending is currently approxi-
mately 1000. Id.
431. Baker & Roll, supra note 269, at 749-50 n.145.
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these proceedings"' and designated U.S. Shoe as the lead case to
determine the constitutional and jurisdictional issues involving
the HMT.433
A. Jurisdictional Analysis
U.S. Shoe Corp., the plaintiff, amici curiae, and the U.S.
Government agreed that the CIT had subject matter jurisdiction
over this dispute.43 4  Title 28, Section 1581 of United States
Code435 grants the CIT exclusive jurisdiction over any civil action
involving federal regulation of import transactions brought
against the United States.436 The authority of the CIT over im-
port transactions and international trade also includes the duty
to review challenges to the constitutionality of a law within these
areas of expertise.43 7
1. CIT Had Proper Jurisdiction Over HMT Dispute Under
Section 1581
Section 4462(f) (2) of the HMT statute directs courts of the
United States to treat the HMT as a customs duty for determin-
ing jurisdiction.4 38 Customs duties, 439 generally referred to as
import transactions,4" ° are imposed by the U.S. Government in
the form of taxes upon the importation or exportation of com-
modities, merchandise, or other goods. 4 ' Accordingly, the
HMT is an import transaction and the CIT had jurisdiction
under Section 1581 to rule on its constitutionality."12 The ques-
432. U.S. Shoe, 17 I.T.R.D.(BNA) at 1281.
433. Id.
434. U.S. Shoe, 907 F. Supp. at 410.
435. 28 U.S.C. § 1581 (1994).
436. Conoco, Inc. v. United States Foreign-Trade Zones Board, 18 F.3d 1581, 1586
(Fed. Cir. 1994).
437. U.S. Shoe, 907 F. Supp. at 410-11; 28 U.S.C. §§ 251, 1331, 1581 (1994).
438. 26 U.S.C. § 4462(f) (2) (1994). U.S.C. § 4462(f) (2) provides that "[f]or pur-
poses of determining the jurisdiction of any court of the United States or any agency of
the United States, the tax imposed by this subchapter shall be treated as if such tax were
a customs duty." Id.
439. Faber, Coe & Gregg (Inc.) v. United States, 19 C.C.PA. 8, 12-13 (1931), cert.
denied, 284 U.S. 634 (1931).
440. U.S. Shoe, 907 F. Supp. at 410.
441. Faber, 19 C.C.P.A. at 12-13. Customs duties embody all taxes imposed upon
imports while in the custody of the customs service. Id.
442. US. Shoe, 907 F. Supp. at 410-11. Previously, in Carnival Cruise Lines, the CIT
assumed jurisdiction over a matter dealing with the HMT. Carnival Cruise Lines v.
United States, 866 F. Supp. 1437 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1994).
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tion still remains as to which subsection controls in this case,
Section 1581(a) or 1581(i)." 3
2. Jurisdiction Under Section 1581 (a)?
The Government contended that jurisdiction Was only
proper under 1581 (a).44 4 Section 1581 (a) grants the CIT exclu-
sive jurisdiction over actions challenging the denial of a pro-
test" filed with the Customs under Title 19, Section 1515 of the
United States Code.446 Under section 1515, a party must file a
protest regarding certain issues enumerated in 19 U.S.C.
§ 1514.4" Customs may grant or deny this protest in whole or in
443. US. Shoe, 907 F. Supp. at 418. The jurisdiction of the CIT under U.S.C.
§ 1581 has been the subject of much discussion. See Carman, supra note 264, at 123
(discussing the confusion and difficulties of obtaining jurisdiction under U.S.C.
§ 1581); Baker & Roll, supra note 269, at 726 (examining the scope of residual jurisdic-
tion under U.S.C. § 1581 (i)). As CIT Judge Carman noted, "[t]he primary jurisdic-
tional statute of the court, 28 U.S.C. § 1581, as it has been interpreted by the courts,
presents a confusing and costly juridictional maze which is seemingly designed to deny
litigants easy access to the CIT." Carman, supra note 264, at 128.
444. Memorandum of the United States in Opposition to Briefs of Amici Curiae at
25, U.S. Shoe, 907 F. Supp. 408 (No. 94-11-00668) [hereinafter Government Brief].
445. Daniel Waltz, The Harbor Maintenance Fee: A Straightforward Constitutional Ques-
tion Buried in A Jurisdictional Quagmire, 5 FED. CIR. B.J. 181, 186 (1995). A protest is an
administrative tool in which an exporter seeks review of a Customs decision. Id.
446. 28 U.S.C. § 1581(a) (1994); 19 U.S.C. § 1515 (1994). U.S.C. § 1581 (a) pro-
vides that "[tihe Court of International Trade shall exclusive jurisdiction of any civil
action commenced to contest the denial of a protest, in whole or in part, under section
515 of the Tariff Act of 1930." 28 U.S.C. § 1581(a) (1994).
447. 19 U.S.C § 1515 (1994); Mitsubishi Elecs. Am., Inc. v. United States, 44 F.3d
973, 976 (Fed. Cir. 1994). U.S.C. § 1514(a) establishes that:
[D]ecisions of the Customs Service, including the legality of all orders and
findings entered into by the same, as to -
(1) the appraised value of merchandise;
(2) the classification and rate and amount of duties chargeable;
(3) all charges or exactions of whatever character within the jurisdiction of
the Secretary of the Treasury;
(4) the exclusion of merchandise from entry or delivery or a demand for re-
delivery to customs custody under any provision of the customs laws, except a
determination under section 1337 of this title;
(5) the liquidation or reliquidation of an entry, or reconciliation as to the
issues contained therein, or any modification thereof;
(6) the refusal to pay a claim for drawback; or
(7) the refusal to reliquidate an entry under section 1520(c) of this title;
shall be final and conclusive upon all persons ... unless a protest is filed in
accordance with this section, or unless a civil action contesting the denial of a
protest, in whole or in part, is commenced in the United States Court of Inter-
national Trade ....
19 U.S.C. § 1514(a) (1994).
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part.448 Before a protest can be filed, Customs first must make a
decision under section 1514.4 41 Absent a decision, a party can-
not initiate a protest and, therefore, the CIT lacks jurisdiction
under section 1581 (a).450 Section 1581 (a) provides for jurisdic-
tion solely over denials of protests based upon a Customs deci-
sion involving the exclusive issues designated in section 1514 .451
The government argued that the CIT could review the plain-
tiff's complaints only after: (1) the plaintiff has protested the
tax payments to Customs; (2) Customs denied this protest; and
(3) the plaintiff sought review of that denial.45 2
The CIT in U.S. Shoe ruled that it did not exercise jurisdic-
tion pursuant to 1581 (a) because Customs did not make a
protestable decision regarding the constitutionality of the tax."5
As noted, a prerequisite for filing a protest and subsequent juris-
diction under Section 1581 (a) is a decision by Customs.4 5 4 The
procedures undertaken by Customs in accordance with the
HMT are ministerial in nature and do not require any decision
on their part.455 Customs merely administers and executes the
provisions of the HMT as adopted by the U.S. Congress.456 U.S.
Shoe Corp. was not protesting payment of the tax, but rather the
constitutionality of the tax.417 Because Customs only performs
administrative duties relating to the HMT and Customs made no
448. Id.
449. U.S. Shoe, 907 F. Supp. at 419; 19 U.S.C. § 1514(c)(1) (1994). U.S.C.
§ 1514(c) requires that "[a] protest of a decision under [section 1514(a)] shall be filed
in writing ... set[ting] forth distinctly and specifically - (A) each decision described in
subsection (a) of this section as to which protest is made .... " 19 U.S.C.
§ 1514(c)(1)(A) (1994).
450. Mitsubishi, 44 F.3d at 977.
451. Id. at 976.
452. Government Brief at 25, U.S. Shoe, 907 F. Supp. 408 (No. 94-11-00668); U.S.
Shoe, 907 F. Supp. at 418.
453. U.S. Shoe, 907 F. Supp. at 420-21. The CIT notes that the plaintiffs are not
protesting the payment of the tax, but rather the constitutionality of the tax. Id. at 420.
Given that "there was no decision of Customs which the companies could protest," the
CIT concluded that jurisdiction under U.S.C. § 1581(a) was improper. Id.; Carnival
Cruise Lines, 866 F. Supp. at 1441 . Similarly, in Carnival Cruise Lines, the CIT found
jurisdiction improper under U.S.C. § 1581(a) because all Customs did was collect pay-
ments filed with quarterly summary reports as required by regulation. Carnival Cruise
Lines, 866 F. Supp. at 1441.
454. Mitsubishi, 44 F.3d at 977.
455. U.S. Shoe, 907 F. Supp. at 420.
456. Id.
457. Id.
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constitutional evaluations,45 jurisdiction was not proper under
Section 1581 (a) .459
3. Jurisdiction Under Section 1581 (i)?
The CIT held that subsection 1581 (i) would provide juris-
diction over the HMT dispute.160 Section 1581 (i) confers exclu.-
sive jurisdiction to the CIT over matters dealing with any law of
the United States providing for revenue from imports and the
administration and enforcement of that law.4 6 1 The HMT is clas.-
sified as a customs duty for jurisdictional purposes and such du-
ties by their nature raise revenue,4 62 therefore situating the HMT
within Section 1581 (i) (1) jurisdiction.4 63 Furthermore, Section
4462(f) (1) of the HMT Act 4 4 indicates that all administrative
and enforcement provisions shall apply to the tax as if it were a
customs duty.4 65 This places the HMT within the jurisdiction of
the CIT, as conferred by Section 1581(i)(4).466 Because the
HMT statute provides for revenue from imports and for the ad-
ministration and enforcement of the tax, the CIT concluded
that proper jurisdiction over this issue fell under subsection
1581(i). 4 6 7
B. Application of the Commerce Clause
The Government initially argued that Congress legitimately
458. Id.
459. U.S. Shoe, 907 F. Supp. at 419-21.
460. Id. at 420-21.
461. 28 U.S.C. § 1581(i) (1994). U.S.C. § 1581(i) provides, in pertinent part, that:
In addition to the jurisdiction conferred upon the Court of International
Trade in subsections (a)-(h) of this section . . . the Court of International
Trade shall have exclusive jurisdiction of any civil action commenced against
the United States, its agencies, or its officers, that arises out of any law of the
United States providing for -
(1) revenue from imports or tonnage;
(2) tariffs, duties, fees, or other taxes on the importation of merchandise for
reasons other than the raising of revenue;...
(4) administration and enforcement with respect to the matters referred to in
paragraphs (1)-(3) of this subsection and subsections (a)-(h) of this section.
28 U.S.C. § 1581(i) (1994).
462. U.S. Shoe, 907 F. Supp. at 421.
463. 28 U.S.C. § 1581(i)(1) (1994); U.S. Shoe, 907 F. Supp. at 421.
464. 26 U.S.C. § 4462(f)(1) (1994).
465. Id.
466. 28 U.S.C. § 1581(i)(4) (1994); U.S. Shoe, 907 F. Supp. at 421.
467. U.S. Shoe, 907 F. Supp. at 421.
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applied its commerce power in levying the HMT and that the
HMT did not implicate its taxation powers.4 6 The Government
claimed the export clause applies only to taxation and not to
regulation of commerce. 469 Because the HMT was enacted pur-
suant to Congress' commercial power and because the HMT was
a valid user fee meant to recover the costs of maintenance, the
Government concluded that the export clause was inapplicable
to this case.4 7 0
The CIT concluded that the commerce power of Congress
cannot eclipse the prohibition set forth in the Export Clause.471
Congress holds a broad authority to regulate commerce without
any restrictions not otherwise delineated by the Constitution.472
When Congress imposes a revenue raising tax upon exports,
however, the Export Clause restricts the Commerce Power.473
Accordingly, the CIT held that even if the HMT was a proper
exercise of Congress' commerce power, the Export Clause re-
strictions still would apply if the HMT was found to serve as a
revenue raising tax or duty.4 74 If Congress levies a charge under
its commerce power and it taxes exported goods in order to
raise revenue, the charge violates the Export Clause.475
C. HMT: Tax or User Fee?
U.S. Shoe Corp. argued that the HMT was a tax.476 U.S.
Shoe asserted that the language of the statute as well as the legis-
lative history made it apparent that the HMT represented a
tax.4 " According to U.S. Shoe Corp., continual references to
the imposition of a tax throughout the HMT statute and Water
Resources Development Act of 1986 supported its position.
468. Government Brief at 51-52, U.S. Shoe, 907 F. Supp. 408 (No. 94-11-00668).
469. Id. at 52.
470. Id.
471. Id.
472. Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 196.
473. U.S. Shoe, 907 F. Supp. at 413.
474. Id.
475. Id.
476. Plaintiff's Brief in Support of Its Motion For Summary judgement at 22, U.S.
Shoe, 907 F. Supp. 408 (No. 94-11-00668) [hereinafter U.S. Shoe Brief].
477. Id. at 22.
478. Id. For example, 26 U.S.C. § 4461 is labeled "Imposition of Tax." 26 U.S.C.
§ 4461 (1994). Additionally, subsection (a) of U.S.C. § 4461 states that "there is hereby
imposed a tax." 26 U.S.C. § 4461(a) (1994). Furthermore, § 1402 of the Water Re-
sources Development Act of 1986 is entitled, "Imposition of a Harbor Maintenance
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Moreover, U.S. Shoe Corp. claimed that the HMT repre-
sents a tax upon exports and not a fee for port use.4 7 9 Because
Congress assessed the tax upon loading of certain cargo and not
all port use, U.S. Shoe Corp. claimed it was not a fee, but rather
an ad valorem tax imposed upon the exported goods them-
selves.48 ° To further support its belief that the HMT taxed ex-
ports, U.S. Shoe Corp. noted that liability for the tax on ex-
ported goods lies solely on the exporter.481
In response, the Government asserted that Congress estab-
lished the HMT as a valid user fee pursuant to its commerce
power.482 The Government averred that the HMT comprised
only one component of a comprehensive legislative plan to pro-
vide for the conservation, development, maintenance, and im-
provement of the nation's water resources infrastructure.8 3 Ac-
cording to the Government, the HMT primarily recovered costs
of harbor maintenance from those who benefit from the use of
the harbors4 8 4 and did not raise revenue for general purposes.485
The Government also noted that commercial shippers did bene-
fit from services provided for by the HMT by receiving safe, navi--
gable ports and harbors through which to export their merchan-
dise.486
The CIT examined whether the HMT was a prohibited tax
or a permitted user fee imposed by Congress pursuant to the
regulation of commerce.48 7 Under the Commerce Clause or the
Export Clause, if the charge is not a tax, then it is not prohibited
by the Constitution.4 8 To determine this issue, the CIT applied
Tax." Water Resources Act of 1986, § 1402, Pub. L. No. 99-662, 100 Stat. at 4266
(1986).
479. U.S. Shoe Brief at 23, U.S. Shoe, 907 F. Supp. 408 (No. 94-11-00668).
480. Id. at 23-26.
481. Id. at 24.
482. Government Brief at 51, U.S. Shoe, 907 F. Supp. 408 (No. 94-11-00668).
483. Id. at 54.
484. Id. at 52, 56.
485. Id. at 54.
486. Government Brief at 66, US. Shoe, 907 F. Supp. 408 (No. 94-11-00668).
487. US. Shoe, 907 F. Supp. at 413-15.
488. Moon, 379 F.2d at 390-92. The Court stated, "the test for determining when a
monetary imposition nominally imposed under the commerce power should be consid-
ered an exercise of the power to raise revenue and therefore barred by the export
clause, i.e., when is it a tax and not a regulation." Id. Previously, the Court, in Armour
Packing Co. v. United States, held that "unless the alleged interference amounts to such
taxation or duty, it does not come within the constitutional prohibition." 209 U.S. 56,
79 (1908).
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the standard established by the Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit in Rodgers v. United States,48 9 which held that courts
should look to the statute as a whole and ascertain whether the
primary purpose was revenue or regulation.49 If Congress' pri-
mary purpose in adopting the statute in question is to raise reve-
nue, and regulation incidentally results therefrom, the charge is
a tax.49' If Congress' primary purpose in enacting the statute in
question is regulation, then the charge is a user fee imposed to
facilitate the regulatory goals of the statute.492
1. Did the HMT Regulate Commerce?
The CIT first determined whether Congress imposed the
HMT to regulate a valid commerce function.49 In South Caro-
lina ex rel. Tindal v. Block,4 94 the Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit held that a 1982 amendment495 to section 201 of the Ag-
ricultural Act of 1949496 was a valid exercise of Congress' com-
merce function.4 9 7 The amendment's primary purpose was to
regulate overproduction of milk and offset a portion of the milk
price support program.498 Congress' exercised its commerce
power to properly regulate the milk industry and did not impli-
cate any constitutional restrictions on its taxation power.4 99
Similarly, in Moon v. Freeman,50° the Ninth Circuit upheld a
489. Rodgers, 138 F.2d at 992 (holding that primary purpose of cotton marketing
quota provisions established under Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938 was regulation
and incidental revenue gained therefrom did not result from taxation).
490. Id. at 994; see supra notes 70-77 and accompanying text (discussing distinction
between programs that charge fee as part of regulation and those that charge fee to
raise revenue).
491. Id.
492. Id.
493. U.S. Shoe, 907 F. Supp. at 413. The Federal Government's commerce power
involves the establishment of rules to regulate commerce. Rodgers, 138 F.2d at 994. A
charge imposed by the Federal Government for the purpose of regulation is a valid
exercise of this power. Moon, 379 F.2d at 393.
494. 717 F.2d 874 (4th Cir. 1983).
495. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-253, § 101, 96
Stat. 763 (Sept. 8, 1982) (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. § 1446 (1994)).
496. 7 U.S.C. § 1446 (1994).
497. Block, 717 F.2d at 887. The court stated that, "[t]he clear language and struc-
ture of the 1982 amendment indicates that its primary purpose is regulation .... Ac-
cordingly, the dairy amendment bears the indelible imprimatur of the commerce
power and is not an unconstitutional exercise of the taxing power." Id.
498. Id.
499. Id.
500. Moon, 379 F.2d at 382.
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wheat marketing allocation program under the Agricultural Act
of 1964.501 Congress' commerce power includes the right to reg-
ulate crop production and prices.5 °0 The Agricultural Act gener-
ally sought to regulate the price of domestic and foreign wheat,
insure that farmers were complying with crop production con-
trols, and raise the income of the wheat farmers.50 3 Because the
Act only intended to regulate crop production and prices and
not to raise revenue, 4 the Act was not an unconstitutional ex-
ercise of Congress' taxing power. 5
In light of such precedent, the CIT in U.S. Shoe determined
that Congress did not intend to regulate commerce with the
HMT.50 6 The CIT concluded that the HMT did not seek to con-
trol the use of harbors or ports.50 7 In addition, the HMT did not
attempt to control commercial practices as did the programs up-
held in Block and Moon.50 8 Rather, the court determined that
Congress imposed the HMT for the purpose of garnering funds
for the maintenance costs of U.S. harbors and ports,509 thereby
raising revenue. 510 Contrary to the HMT, the programs in Rod-
gers, Block, and Moon all raised revenue as an incidental conse-
quence of their execution. 1
501. Agricultural Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-297, § 101, 78 Stat. 173, 178-79 (codi-
fied at 7 U.S.C. §§ 1348-49 (1994)).
502. Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 127-28 (1942).
503. Moon, 379 F.2d at 391. The court noted:
We have set out earlier the general announced purposes of the wheat market-
ing allocation program for the 1964-65 marketing year. These are consistent
with the exercise of the commerce power. Nothing in the legislative history of
the Act indicates that the purpose of the legislation was in any way related to
the raising of revenue.
Id. at 391-92.
504. Id. The Court in Moon conceded that if the program had generated large
amounts of revenue, they would not consider it an exercise of the commerce power. Id.
at 392.
505. Id. at 391.
506. U.S. Shoe, 907 F. Supp. at 413-14.
507. Id.
508. Id.
509. S. ReP. No. 126, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1985). The HMT was characterized
as a "new tax to cover a portion of Federal spending." Id. In fact, the court properly
recognized that the tax was actually an alternative mode of fund-raising by the federal
government to cover the costs of improvement and maintenance of the country's water
systems. US Shoe, 907 F. Supp. at 414; H.R. REP. No. 228, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1985).
510. US. Shoe, 907 F. Supp. at 414.
511. Rodgers, 138 F.2d at 995. The court acknowledged that revenue may be an
incidental result of the charge levied against farmers for the right to produce cotton at
an amount over their statutory allotment, but this fact does not strip the regulation of
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2. Was the HMT a User Fee?
The CIT in US. Shoe also recognized that if Congress in-
tended to establish a user fee and not a tax, then the HMT
would be a valid exercise of its commerce power.512 Congress
establishes user fees in order to compensate the government for
the cost of services rendered in furtherance of its regulatory
goals.5"3 In the Head Money Cases,5"4 the Supreme Court found a
head charge51 5 upon incoming immigrants paid for by the own-
ers of the shipping vessels to be a constitutionally proper exer-
cise of Congress' commerce power. 16 The Supreme Court rea-
soned that Congress imposed the fee in order to raise money to
pay for the temporary care of distressed passengers brought to
the United States and not to support the Federal Government.517
Likewise, in Pace v. Burgess,518 the Supreme Court held that a
tobacco export stamp, used to distinguish tobacco intended for
its commercial character. Id. In Block, the court stated that, "the mere fact a statute
raises revenue does not imprint upon it the characteristics of a law by which the taxing
power is exercised." 717 F.2d at 887; see Moon, 379 F.2d at 392 (noting that funds raised
by sale of export marketing certificates by Commodity Credit Corporation ("CCC")
were used to defray costs of implementing this program and not to raise revenue). It
appeared from an affadavit by John W. Vaughan, acting controller of the CCC, the
issuer of the wheat exporting certificates, that the CCC received a US$30 million bal-
ance from the charge but that this was eventually used to cover costs assumed by the
CCC. Id. at 392 n.30. The court, in U.S. Shoe, apparently took heed in the Moon Court's
warning that "if the record in any way indicated that substantial amounts of revenue
had been generated by the sale of export certificates, we would hesitate before deeming
the program an exercise of the commerce power." U.S. Shoe, 907 F. Supp. at 414 (quot-
ing Moon, 379 F.2d at 392). This fact is evidenced by the huge surplus that has accumu-
lated in the Trust Fund to date and will continue to grow in the future. See McDermott
Bill, supra note 415, at E519 (illustrating large surplus in Trust Fund). Further evidence
of revenue generation exists because the HMT is on budget and is used to help offset
the large federal budget deficit, thereby appearing to be a source of revenue. See
BUDGET PERSPECTWE, supra note 426, at 251, 325 and accompanying text (discussing
how HMT is on budget and illustrating affects of this).
512. U.S. Shoe, 907 F. Supp. at 413-14; Pace v. Burgess, 92 U.S. 372, 375 (1875).
The HMT needs to be looked at for its substance rather than just its moniker as a "tax."
Pace, 92 U.S. at 376. In the words ofJustice Bradley, "we must regard things rather than
names," and if the HMT in fact acts like a user fee than it should be evaluated as a user
fee. Id.
513. Pace, 92 U.S. at 375. The Court warned that the danger to guard against is
the "imposition of a duty under the pretext of fixing a fee." Id. at 376.
514. Head Money Cases (Edye v. Robertson), 112 U.S. 580 (1884).
515. PELTASON, supra note 36, at 40. A state imposes a head tax upon every person
of that state. Id.
516. Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. at 599-600.
517. Id. at 596.
518. Pace, 92 U.S. at 372.
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exportation, was a fee.5 1 9 The Court found the charge for the
stamp was a fee meant to cover the costs of services properly ren-
dered in implementing the stamp exemption program, includ-
ing the cost of paper, ink, and printing.5"' Also, the price of the
stamps never exceeded the amount necessary to cover the costs
required to implement the program, which benefitted the ex-
porters by distinguishing which goods would be exempt from
taxes.
52 1
In the present case, the CIT, relying on the legislative his-
tory of the HMT statute, the Head Money Cases,5 2 and Pace2
declared that Congress did not intend to create a user fee when
it adopted the HMT.524 The CIT noted that the tax was estab-
lished to help pay for the costs of developing, operating, and
maintaining U.S. ports for all uses, commercial as well as recrea-
tional.525 Moreover, Congress based the tax on the value of the
cargo, and did not guarantee that the Trust Fund would be used
only for harbor maintenance.526 In fact, money from the Trust
Fund went to support the work of the Department of the Treas-
ury and could go potentially to the National Oceanic & Atmos-
pheric Association.5 7 Furthermore, Customs collected the tax'
to support future projects rather than to pay for recently com-
pleted projects.528
The CIT also evaluated the HMT under the test established
by the Supreme Court in Massachusetts v. United States529 to dis-
cern whether the HMT was a user fee or an impermissible tax on
exports.530 According to the Court in Massachusetts, a user fee
519. Id. at 375.
520. Id.
521. Id.
522. Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. at 580.
523. Pace, 92 U.S. at 372.
524. U.S. Shoe, 907 F. Supp. at 414-15.
525. See S. REP. No. 126, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1985) (stating that tax was
adopted in order to help fund maintenance of U.S. harbors and ports).
526. Id.; U.S. Shoe, 907 F. Supp. at 414-15.
527. BUDGET APPENDIX, supra note 405, at 376.
528. See S. REP. No. 126, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1985) (noting that HMT is col-
lected to fund future maintenance and development projects).
529. 435 U.S. 444 (1978).
530. Massachusetts, 435 U.S. at 460-70. The Supreme Court, in Massachusetts, con-
fronted the issue of whether a state should be immune from a federal aircraft registra-
tion tax. Id. at 446. The State of Massachusetts was assessed the registration tax for a
helicopter it used primarily for police functions. Id. at 452. The Court held that the
registration tax was actually a user fee and did not violate the implied immunity of a
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does not constitute a tax if the charge: (1) does not discriminate
against a constitutionally protected state function;53 (2) was
based upon a fair approximation of the use of the implemented
system; and (3) was structured to produce revenues that will not
exceed the total cost to the Federal Government of the benefits
supplied.5" 2 In U.S. Shoe, the CIT did not address the issue of
discrimination but proceeded to apply the second two prongs of
the test to the HMT.533 Under the second prong of the Massa-
chusetts test, the CIT found that the HMT was not based on a fair
approximation of the cost of the benefits supplied by the govern-
ment to port users.53 4 The CIT noted that although low-value
bulk cargo exporters535 use port facilities more often than high-
value non-bulk exporters,536 they pay less taxes. 537 Furthermore,
state government from federal taxation. Id. at 460-70. No constitutional doctrines,
therefore, were implicated by this tax. Id. at 467-70. Although this case dealt with the
implied constitutional doctrine of state immunity from federal taxation, the test em-
ployed by the Court has been adopted and applied to many different constitutional
situations, including the present case. See Brief of Certain Amici Curiae in Support of
Plaintiff's Motion for SummaryJudgement at 26, U.S. Shoe, 907 F. Supp. 408 (No. 94-11-
00668) [hereinafter Brown-Forman Brief] (arguing that CIT should apply the Massa-
chusetts test to Export Clause issue).
531. Massachusetts, 435 U.S. at 466-67. The Court first considered whether the tax
disciminated against the constitutionally protected state function of operating a police
force. Id. at 466-67. In Massachusetts, Congress placed a tax on all civil aircraft that fly
in the navigable airspace of the United States. Id. at 449-50. The tax fell upon certain
aircraft used by the State of Massachusetts to execute the essential and traditional state
function of operating a police force, including patrolling its highways and performing
other police functions. Id. The State of Massachusetts claimed that its implied constitu-
tional immunity from federal taxation on essential state activities protected it from the
tax imposed by Congress. Id. at 452.
532. Id. at 466-67.
533. U.S. Shoe, 907 F. Supp. at 415. The CIT recognized that the Export Clause
clearly functions to protect the constitutionally valued activity of exportation from the
burdens of taxation and the HMT could, therefore, be discriminatory. Id. The CIT did
not delve into this issue and instead proceeded, under the assumption of nondiscrimi-
nation, to invalidate the HMT under prongs two and three of the Massachussetts test. Id.
534. Id. at 411.
535. Robertshaw, supra note 16, at 1. Routine shipments of items such as food
additives would be considered low value exports. Id. A typical container of the above
item would be worth US$50,000 and pay taxes of approximately US$62. Id.; Christiano
Statement, supra note 420, at 142.
536. Christiano Statement, supra note 420, at 142. Precious metals are high value
exports. Id. One cargo container of precious metals would face taxes of approximately
US$3750. Id. Another example of a high value exporter is Eastman Kodak who ships
5000 containers of cargo yearly and faces taxes of approximately US$1.5 million on
their shipments. Robertshaw, supra note 16, at 1.
537. Christiano Statement, supra note 420, at 142. According to Christiano, it would
take 60 containers of a low value commodity to equal the taxes paid on one container
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ports such as Seattle and Tacoma pay much higher taxes than
other less frequented ports but require and receive in return less
fund money than these other ports.5 38 These facts illustrated
that the HMT was unfairly approximated to the costs of servicing
U.S. harbors and ports.539
Applying the third prong, the CIT found that the HMT rev-
enue exceeded the cost incurred by the Government in provid-
ing these services. 5 0 In support of this conclusion, the CIT
noted that the tax had produced a large and growing surplus, 4 1
above and beyond the costs incurred by the Government. 542 Ad-
ditionally, the court recognized that the tax was used to fund
projects slated for the future and not to repay the Government
for past or current services rendered.543 If the fund was used to
support future projects, then the money raised did not correlate
to the costs of present day maintenance.14'
D. Export Clause Analysis
Having concluded that the Commerce Clause cannot over-
ride the Export Clause and that the HMT was a tax and not a
of precious metals. Id. A good example of this situation is illustrated by the following
scenario:
Two vessels are docked at a port to receive cargo for export. The first ship is a
medium-capacity, shallow-draft vessel that is to be loaded with five computer
systems with a value of $30 million. To load this merchandise requires a single
crane to place the five computers into the cargo hold. At the current rate of
.125 percent, the HMT on this "port use" would amount to $37,500. The sec-
ond ship, a large-capacity, deep-draft vessel, is to carry a load of automobiles
with an average value of $15,000. To incur the same HMT liability, it would be
necessary to load 2,000 cars onto this ship. This would entail 2,000 separate
loading operations, considerable time and significant dock space.
Aris-Isotoner Brief at 25 n.25, U.S. Shoe, 907 F. Supp. 408 (No. 94-11-00668).
538. McDermott Bill, supra note 415, at E519. The ports of Seattle and Tacoma,
estimate that their shippers pay over US$50 million in taxes. Id. In return, the ports
receive less than US$1 million in harbor maintenance funds, mainly because they are.
naturally deep-dredged harbors and require less maintenance. Id. A further example
of this disproportionate allocation of HMT funds is demonstrated by the Port of Los
Angeles. U.S. Shoe, 907 F. Supp. at 415. In 1992, the Army Corps of Engineers esti-
mated that the Port of Los Angeles paid US$78.7 million in taxes and received only
US$162,000 in return for maintenance and operations. Id.
539. Massachusetts, 435 U.S. at 466.
540. U.S. Shoe, 907 F. Supp. at 415.
541. Id.; see supra notes 424-27 and accompanying text (discussing development of
Trust Fund surplus).
542. US. Shoe, 907 F. Supp. at 415.
543. Id.; S. REP. No. 126, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1985).
544. US. Shoe, 907 F. Supp. at 415.
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user fee, the CIT then addressed the question of whether the
HMT violated the prohibitions of the Export Clause of the Con-
stitution.545 U.S. Shoe Corp. argued that the charge imposed by
the HMT was a tax upon exports and therefore in violation of
the Export Clause of the Constitution.546 The Government
counterargued that the HMT did not fall upon exported articles
within the meaning of the Export Clause. 547
1. Should CIT Apply Traditional or Narrow Export Clause
Analysis?
Relying on the traditional Supreme Court export analysis, 4
U.S. Shoe Corp. argued that the HMT burdened the exportation
process and was directly connected to the value of the exported
goods.549 According to U.S. Shoe Corp., the HMT attached to
goods being loaded onto a vessel for exportation, which placed
it well within the process of exportation. 550 U.S. Shoe Corp. fur-
ther alleged that the loading of cargo represented an essential
part of the exportation process and a tax upon loading acts as a
tax upon the goods themselves.55- '
The Government argued that, as a result of recent Supreme
Court decisions, the traditional export stream test had been
overruled. 2 The Government's argument relied on two cases,
Michelin55 and Washington Stevedoring Companies,554 both of
which established a narrow approach to Import-Export Clause
analysis.555 The Government urged the CIT not to read the Ex-
port Clause as broadly as the traditional export stream test ap-
plied by the plaintiff and the Supreme Court.556 The Govern-
ment argued that the CIT should determine whether Congress
545. Id. at 416.
546. U.S. Shoe Brief at 27, U.S. Shoe, 907 F. Supp. 408 (No. 94-11-00668).
547. Government Brief at 92, U.S. Shoe, 907 F. Supp. 408 (No. 94-11-00668); U.S.
Shoe, 907 F. Supp. at 416.
548. See supra notes 93-178 and accompanying text (describing traditional
Supreme Court Export Clause analysis).
549. U.S. Shoe Brief at 36, U.S. Shoe, 907 F. Supp. 408 (No. 94-11-00668).
550. Id. at 31.
551. Id. at 32-34.
552. Id.
553. Michelin, 423 U.S. at 276.
554. Washington Stevedoring, 435 U.S. at 734.
555. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 2.
556. Government Brief at 97, U.S. Shoe, 907 F. Supp. 408 (No. 94-11-00668); U.S.
Shoe, 907 F. Supp. at 415-16.
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placed the HMT upon exported articles under the Export
Clause by taking a narrow approach similar to the approach
used in recent Supreme Court decisions interpreting the Im-
port-Export Clause of the Constitution. 57 Applying this narrow
Michelin,558 Washington Stevedoringe59 approach, the Government
contended that the HMT represented a nondiscriminatory tax
that did not target exports and only applied to services that facil-
itate560 exportation. 51 The Government argued, therefore, that
the HMT did not violate the Export Clause because it did not tax
exports.56
2
The CIT disagreed with the Government and refused to ap-
ply this analysis to the Export Clause.563 The CIT limited its in-
quiry to that of the Export Clause. 56' First, the CIT stated that a
difference exists between the language of the two clauses.5 65
The language of the Export Clause prohibits any tax or duty,
while the Import-Export Clause limits itself to only imposts or
duties.5 1 The entire rationale of Michelin5 67 and Washington
Stevedoringe68 relied on this distinction, differentiating between
the narrowly construed terms imposts or duties and the broadly
construed term general tax.569
In addition to this language, the CIT recognized that differ-
ent policies underlie these clauses.5 0 As illustrated by the IBM
Court, the Import-Export Clause prohibited states from impos-
557. U.S. Shoe, 907 F. Supp. at 418-19; IBM, 59 F.3d at 1237.
558. Michelin, 423 U.S. at 276.
559. Washington Stevedoring, 435 U.S. at 734.
560. Government Brief at 97, U.S. Shoe, 907 F. Supp. 408 (No. 94-11-00668). Serv-
ices necessary to the import-export process such as unloading or loading of cargo are
services that facilitate exportation. Washington Stevedoring, 423 U.S. at 757; Government
Brief at 97, U.S. Shoe, 907 F. Supp. 408 (No. 94-11-00668).
561. Government Brief at 97, U.S. Shoe, 907 F. Supp. 408 (No. 94-11-00668); US.
Shoe, 907 F. Supp. at 416.
562. Government Brief at 97, US. Shoe, 907 F. Supp. 408 (No. 94-11-00668).
563. US. Shoe, 907 F. Supp. at 416.
564. Id. at 416. The court in US. Shoe followed the reasoning applied by the court
in IBM to disapprove of the Government's desired analysis. See IBM, 59 F.3d at 1238-39
(noting differences between Export and Import-Export Clauses).
565. U.S. Shoe, 907 F. Supp. at 416; IBM, 59 F.3d at 1239.
566. Michelin, 423 U.S. at 290-91.
567. Id. at 276.
568. Washington Stevedoring, 435 U.S. at 734.
569. See Michelin, 423 U.S. at 290-91 (illustrating difference in language between
Export and Import-Export Clauses).
570. U.S. Shoe, 907 F. Supp. at 417-18.
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ing taxes upon imported or exported goods moving through
their state. 57 ' The Export Clause, however, served the broader
purpose of prohibiting taxation on exports by the Federal Gov-
ernment.572 The Court in IBM held that the Export Clause need
not be construed in a manner similar to the Import-Export
Clause. 57' The CIT agreed with the Court in IBM and held that
the defendant's use of Michelin574 and Washington Stevedoring
75
in this case was inapplicable. 6
2. The Traditional Export Clause Analysis Applied
The CIT in U.S. Shoe applied the traditional approach to
Export Clause analysis to determine whether the HMT was a tax
upon exported goods. 577 The CIT first determined whether
Congress had imposed the HMT upon goods in the export pro-
cess.578 The CIT then determined how closely related Congress'
tax was to the value of the exported goods.5 7 9
a. Did the HMT Tax Exported Goods?
The Supreme Court holdings in Turpin5 ° Cornell,58 l and
Spalding5 82 indicated that the Court considers a good an export
under the Export Clause if it has passed beyond the manufactur-
571. IBM, 59 F.3d at 1239. The court noted that the "[I] mport-Export Clause was
intended to prohibit States from imposing a 'transit fee' on goods moving in foreign
commerce . .. ." Id.
572. Id. The court stated that the "[E]xport Clause served the broader purpose of
'forbidding federal taxation of exports.' " Washington Stevedoring, 435 U.S. at 758.
573. IBM, 59 F.3d at 1239. The court reasoned that "the Supreme Court's current
narrower view of the prohibition in the Import-Export Clause thus does not dictate that
the Export Clause be given a similarly narrow construction." Id.
574. Michelin, 423 U.S. at 276.
575. Washington Stevedoring, 435 U.S. at 734.
576. U.S. Shoe, 907 F. Supp. at 416-17.
577. Turpin, 117 U.S. at 507; Fairbank, 181 U.S. at 292.
578. U.S. Shoe, 907 F. Supp. at 417.
579. Id. at 417-18.
580. Turpin, 117 U.S. at 504; see supra notes 106-12 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing Turpin decision which held tax upon tobacco manufactured for exportation
constitutionally valid because it only taxed goods intended for exportation).
581. Cornell, 192 U.S. at 418; see supra notes 114-18 and accompanying text (evalu-
ating Cornell holding which concluded that nondiscriminatory tax placed on all manu-
factured cheese did not violate Export Clause because it taxed goods prior to and not
during exportation).
582. Spalding, 262 U.S. at 66; see supra notes 119-27 and accompanying text (exam-
ining Spalding decision that determined process of exportation to begin upon delivery
of goods by exporter to carrier).
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ing and preparation stage and has begun the process of exporta-
tion. Because liability for the HMT attached at the time of
loading of cargo to be exported from the United States,584 the
CIT in U.S. Shoe found that the HMT taxed cargo far along the
process of exportation.5 8 5 The CIT reasoned that if the delivery
of cargo in Spalding was sufficiently within the stream of exporta-
tion, then the next step of loading that cargo onto a vessel would
also fall within the Export Clause prohibition. 586
b. Does the HMT Attach to the Value of the Goods?
The Almy, 58 7 Fairbank,588 Hvoslef, 589 Thames and Mersey,590
and IBM 1' line of cases demonstrated the inclination of the
Supreme Court to invalidate taxes that not only burden the ex-
ported goods but also the articles and documents that facilitate
the exportation of the goods. 59 2  Based on this line of prece-
dent, the CIT in U.S. Shoe concluded that the HMT represented
583. Turpin, 117 U.S. at 507; see supra notes 106-12 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing Turpin, Cornell, and Spalding holdings illustrating distinction between intending
to export and exporting). .
584. 26 U.S.C. § 4461 (c)(2) (A) (1994).
585. U.S. Shoe, 907 F. Supp. at 418.
586. Id. The CIT compared the HMT with the entrance point to the process of
exportation set up in Spalding and concluded that the HMT is applied to goods well
beyond this point. Id.
587. Almy, 65 U.S. at 169; see supra notes 136-41 and accompanying text (discussing
Almy which held taxes on bills of lading to be unconstitutional burdens on exporta-
tion).
588. Fairbank, 181 U.S. at 283; see supra notes 143-50 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing Fairbank holding which found taxes on foreign bills of lading to be unconstitu-
tional taxes upon exports).
589. Hvoslef, 237 U.S. at 1; see supra notes 151-58 and accompanying text (consider-
ing Hvoslef case holding taxes on charter party contracts for shipment of cargo in viola-
tion of Export Clause for essentially taxing exports themselves).
590. Thames & Mersey, 237 U.S. at 19; see supra notes 160-68 and accompanying
text (addressing Thames & Mersey and conclusion that taxes on marine risk insurance
polices are closely associated to value of exported goods and therefore unconstitu-
tional).
591. IBM, 59 F.3d at 1234; see supra notes 169-78 and accompanying text (review-
ing IBM holding which similarly held that taxes on marine risk insurance polices vio-
lated Export Clause by taxing closely to value of exported goods themselves).
592. See Almy, 65 U.S at 169 (invalidating tax upon bill of lading); Fairbank, 181
U.S. at 283 (holding tax upon foreign bill of lading is tax on exported goods them-
selves); Hvoslef, 237 U.S. at 1 (holding that tax upon charter parties contracts is uncon-
stitutional); Thames & Mersey, 237 U.S. at 19 (holding that tax upon marine insurance
policies violates export clause); IBM, 59 F.3d at 1234 (upholding Thames & Mersey and
holding tax upon marine insurance policies unconstitutional).
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a tax applied even more closely to the exported goods than the
well-established precedent on which the court relied.593 In fact,
the CIT determined that the HMT assessed liability directly on
the value of the cargo itself and not upon any documents used in
exportation or any services rendered to assist exportation. 594 Ac-
cordingly, the CIT concluded that neither of the two tests set
forth above supported the constitutionality of the HMT.595
III. U.S. SHOE PROTECTS THE U.S. MARITIME INDUSTRY
FROM THE BURDENS OF THE HMT AND SHOULD
BE UPHELD ON APPEAL
Upon review, the Federal Circuit should uphold the deci-
sion by the CIT that the HMT violates the Export Clause of the
Constitution. By placing a tax on exports, the HMT violates the
enumerated restriction of the Export Clause and the underlying
goals behind its adoption. The Constitution, therefore, requires
that the HMT be invalidated and the problems it has spawned
corrected.
A. Economic Considerations
U.S. commerce should be protected from any undue bur-
dens placed upon it by export taxes in order to facilitate eco-
nomic growth and maintain the U.S. position in the emerging
World economy.596 In 1995, foreign trade accounted for over
twenty percent of the U.S. gross domestic product.597 By the
year 2010, the combined value of imports and exports likely will
increase to a total of US$1.6 trillion, accounting for nearly 1.5
billion tons of foreign cargo.
As a result of CFTA and NAFTA and the emphasis they
place on free international trade, the importance of U.S. ports
to the economic well-being of the United States will increase in
coming years. 599 CFTA and NAFTA intended to create free
trade access between the United States, Mexico, and Canada in
593. U.S. Shoe, 907 F. Supp. at 418.
594. Id. As the Court commented, "Congress could not have imposed the Tax any
closer to exportation, or more immediate to the articles exposed." Id.
595. Id.
596. Stromberg Statement, supra note 16, at 144-45.
597. Id.
598. Id. at 145.
599. Id.
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order to stimulate international trade and investment among the
three countries and with the rest of the World. 6°° The HMT
contradicts the policies underlying the passage of CFTA and
NAFTA by placing a burden on the exportation of goods out of
the United States. The HMT also placed the U.S. export indus-
try at a severe disadvantage vis-a-vis the rest of the world by forc-
ing a rise in prices on such market-volatile goods as agricultural
products.60 1 The continued health of the growing U.S. export
industry depends on remaining free of burdens such as the
HMT, and the Federal Circuit should consider this fact in re-
viewing the CIT decision.
Just as the national economy reaps the benefits of export
trade, so too do local economies. 60 2 In 1989, port usage ac-
counted for 1.2 million jobs, provided US$28.4 billion in per-
sonal income, generated US$3.6 billion in state and local taxes,
and produced daily economic impacts of US$268 million.60 3
These numbers will presumably continue to rise as export trade
remains a key ingredient to the economic success of the United
States.60 4 Unfortunately, the HMT has had a negative effect on
these local economies by diverting business to other ports and to
other modes of transportation such as rail and truck.605 As a
result of this diversion, the ports such as Seattle and Tacoma are
likely to suffer losses of approximately 1300 and 2500 jobs, re-
spectively. 60 6 Also, because of this diversion, the port of Boston
has lost approximately two million tons of cargo to Canadian
ports over the last ten years.60 7 In addition, traditional shipping
600. Alexander, supra note 29, at 48-49.
601. See supra notes 314-20 and accompanying text (examining competitive disad-
vantage placed upon U.S. exporters by HMT).
602. Aylward Statement, supra note 16, at 76.
603. Id.
604. Stromberg Statement, supra note 16, at 145. As Stromberg explains:
Ports activity links every community in our nation to the world marketplace -
enabling us to create export opportunities and to deliver imported goods
more inexpensively to consumers across the nation. With the passage of
NAFTA and GATT', the important role our ports play in the economic well-
being of the nation will only increase.
Id.
605. See supra notes 406-16 and accompanying text (discussing diversion of cargo
to Canada).
606. Ports Statement, supra note 423, at 166-67.
607. Tax Drives Firms to Canadian Ports, Exporters Trucking Goods North, PATRIOT
LEDGER, May 2, 1995, at 5.
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vessels such as the "Incan Superior," hurt by the increased HMT,
gradually are ceasing operations through U.S. ports, thereby
leading to even more lost port use, income, and jobs.6"8 Local
economies are essential to the success of the national economy;
in order to operate successfully, they need to be protected from
the adverse trends created by the HMT.
Admittedly, U.S. ports and harbors do need maintenance
and repair to keep them operational and available to play the
important role that they do. Although, the Government would
like the commercial shippers to provide a larger portion of this
cost,"09 the HMT is not the answer. Prior to 1986, general gov-
ernment funding supported port and harbor maintenance.61 0
The adoption of the HMT addressed the issue of sharing the
cost of port and harbor maintenance and not the necessity for
more money.611 Together, private industry and the federal gov-
ernment can successfully provide for port and harbor mainte-
nance without adopting tax measures such as the HMT. The
public port industry, for example, has contributed more than
US$12.5 billion over the last forty-five years to develop and main-
tain port facilities.6"' The Federal Government along with the
port industry have spent nearly US$4 billion over this time to
improve and maintain the U.S. waterways infrastructure.613 Ad-
ditionally, in 1992, the public ports spent US$671.8 million on
construction and modernization of terminal facilities and chan-
nel dredging.614 Furthermore, the American Association of Port
Authorities estimates that it will invest US$514 million in local
dollars to dredging during 1993-97.615
608. Cumulative Impact of Taxes and Various Fees Levied on the Maritime Industry: Hear-
ings Before the Subcommittee on Oversights and Investigations, House Merchant Marine and
Fisheries Committee, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 124 (May 23, 1991) (statement of Davis
Helberg, Executive Director, Seaway Port Authority of Duluth).
609. See supra notes 375-78 and accompanying text (describing government spend-
ing on harbor maintenance and reasons for adoption of HMT).
610. Id.
611. H.R. REP. No. 228, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1985); S.R. No. 128, 99th Cong.
1st Sess. 9 (1985).
612. Stromberg Statement 94, supra note 407, at 480.
613. Id.
614. Id.
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B. Constitutional Considerations
The decision in U.S. Shoe should be upheld in order to pre-
serve a long-standing Supreme Court precedent, that of the
broad interpretation of the Export Clause as a prohibition on
any burden upon exportation. 616 The Export Clause has ena-
bled the U.S. export industry to remain free from impediments
and operate successfully to further the U.S. economy for the past
209 years. It would be unwise to abandon this view and adopt a
narrow view based on the Import-Export Clause. The CIT was
correct in maintaining the sanctity of the Export Clause and in
upholding the legal consequences that traditional Export Clause
interpretation has generated. The Export Clause and the Im-
port-Export Clause are distinct provisions that should be consid-
ered and analyzed individually.
Traditionally, U.S. courts analyzed the Import-Export
Clause in the same manner as the Export Clause.6 17 The entire
basis for the Michelin decision was that the Import-Export Clause
was distinct from the Export Clause and that the purposes and
prohibitions of each were distinct.61' As a result, the Michelin
Court abandoned the traditional interpretation of the Import-
Export Clause and found it necessary to limit its interpretation
to apply only to certain types of imposts or duties, not to all
taxes.6 1 9 Ultimately, the reason the Court adopted this new Im-
port-Export Clause approach was that it recognized the distinc-
tion between this clause and the Export Clause.62 °
The Government would like the courts to apply the Michelin
approach to analysis of taxes under the Export Clause.62' Upon
review, the Federal Circuit should not apply this narrow Michelin
approach to Export Clause analysis. It would be circular and il-
logical to apply the Michelin Import-Export Clause analysis to the
very clause it was meant to differentiate from, the Export Clause.
616. See supra notes 93-178 and accompanying text (examining traditional Export
Clause analysis).
617. See supra notes 179-86 and accompanying text (reviewing traditional analysis
of Import-Export Clause prior to Michelin)
618. See supra notes 198-235 and accompanying text (examining narrow Michelin
approach to Import-Export Clause analysis)
619. Id.
620. Id.
621. See supra notes 547-57 and accompanying text (explaining government argu-
ment for narrow Export Clause approach)
182719961
1828 FORDHAMINTERNATIONALLAWJOURNAL [Vol. 19:1764
The Michelin approach has not been applied to a federal tax and
it is not appropriate to do so now. Furthermore, if the tradi-
tional, broad approach to the Export Clause is abandoned in
favor of a new, narrower approach, based on the Import-Export
Clause, the court would empower Congress to reintroduce a tax
that burdens exportation. By adopting a narrow approach,
courts, in effect, would be inviting Congress to enact additional
measures similar in content and effect to the HMT, with possibly
even more severe consequences.
C. Trade Agreement Implications
Article 314 of NAFTA prohibits any party to the Agreement
from imposing a tax upon exports.6 2 The HMT, as it stands, is a
tax on exports.623 The decision in U.S. Shoe should be upheld in
order to shield the United States from possible repercussions of
the HMT violating Article 314 of NAFTA. 6 2 4 In the event such a
violation occurs, the Commission would have the authority to
enforce removal of the HMT or to require the United States to
compensate Canada and/or Mexico for financial losses stem-
ming from the HMT as the result of increased export prices due
to the HMT.62 5 Moreover, continued use of the HMT could
open the door for similar measures in retaliation by Canada and
Mexico,6 26 thereby increasing the cost of those countries exports
to the U.S. consumer. Furthermore, continued implementation
of this tax could result in the loss of privileges the United States
presently possesses under NAFTA.627 Although these last two op-
tion are highly unlikely, the implementation of the HMT could
lead to potentially significant restrictions on the foreign free
trade that the United States now enjoys.
CONCLUSION
As the United States enters the next millennium, export
trade in the ever expanding international marketplace will play
622. NAFTA, supra note 28, art. 314, 32 I.L.M. at 303.
623. See supra notes 93-178 and accompanying text (presenting CIT discussion of
HMT as tax on exports).
624. See supra notes 347-63 and accompanying text (describing NAFTA dispute res-
olution mechanisms and consequences of NAFTA violations)
625. NAFTA SuMMARY, supra note 344, at 102.
626. McKim, supra note 243, at 516.
627. Id. at 516 n.279.
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an integral role in the future economic success of our country.
By establishing the HMT, the U.S. Congress enacted a measure
that thwarts this essential foreign export trade. The economic
strength of the United States in the increasingly important and
expanding international marketplace is dependant on the elimi-
nation of adverse measures such as the HMT. The CIT's deci-
sion holding the HMT unconstitutional, therefore, should be
upheld in order to maintain the vitality of the U.S. export indus-
try and to preserve the important economic benefits that U.S.
ports and harbors create both locally and nationally. Finally, the
traditional export analysis applied in this case should also be up-
held to maintain existing limitations on Congress' ability to tax
exports and to ensure the success of the U.S. export industry and
the U.S. economy for decades to come.

